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Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door. 
-Plaque on the Statue of Liberty 
Unconscionability decisions mix radical rhetoric with conservative actions. 
The courts often sound like they are doing something extreme, but their actions do 
not bear this out. Parties remain free to determine with whom they will trade and 
upon what terms. This is true no matter how unreasonable a given contract may 
appear to an outside observer. Unconscionability maintains its relevance as a sup-
plement to traditional contract defense doctrines.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1971, W. David Slawson estimated that 99% of all contracts do not 
resemble the Platonic ideal of a document of jointly negotiated terms, but 
rather are lists of terms presented by one party to the other on a pre-printed 
form.2 Although this estimate is forty years old, it underestimates our cur-
rent market exchange situation; the pervasiveness of form contracts stipulat-
ed by one party has increased.3  
Contract law generally provides for the enforcement of such contracts, 
allowing the powerful party to essentially govern over consumers and 
weaker parties.4 Classical contract theory allows for this enforcement of 
contracts based upon a number of assumptions about human nature and the 
bargaining process. 
For instance, it assumes that the parties freely enter into an agreement 
or bargain as equals.5 To see why the legal community believes parties can 
freely bargain as equals, we must imagine a world in which the perfect con-
tract exists. A perfect contract is one in which all contingencies are account-
ed for and efficiently allocated between the parties, all relevant information 
has been communicated, each resource is with the party who values it the 
  
 1. Daniel T. Ostas, Predicting Unconscionability Decisions: An Economic Model 
and an Empirical Test, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 535, 583 (1992). 
 2. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
making Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971).  
 3. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Uncon-
scionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203-04 (2003).  
 4. Slawson, supra note 2, at 536. 
 5. LAURENCE KOFFMAN & ELIZABETH MACDONALD, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 4 (6th 
ed. 2007). 
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most, each risk is allocated to the least cost bearer, and no future gains from 
exchange are possible.6  
Furthermore, classical contract theory assumes parties will be able to 
bargain equally because they have similar resources7 and all contracting 
parties are rational adults.8  
In a world of perfect contracts and rational parties, the state should 
regulate or intervene as little as possible. It is not the task of the law to en-
sure that a fair bargain is struck or to inquire whether the parties had in fact 
met as equals.9 Rather, it is the task of the individual bargainers of the con-
tract to ensure the terms of the contract are fair.  
We live in a world where perfect contracts do not exist, and vulnerable 
contracting parties such as consumers, tenants, the poverty-stricken,10 and 
employees often suffer as a result.11 The law of contract is engaged in trying 
to balance the upholding of traditional market liberalism with the need to 
protect those who may be vulnerable.12 One way of protecting the vulnera-
ble in contract law is through increasing the court’s usage of the doctrine of 
unconscionability.  
  
 6. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 186 (2d ed. 1997). 
 7. Classical contract theory thus assumes the existence of general competition. See 
KOFFMAN & MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 4. In the classical model of contracts, true equali-
ty is a prerequisite for freedom of contract. Id. 
 8. See Paula England, The Separative Self: Androcentric Bias in Neoclassical 
Assumptions, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS 37, 37-38 
(Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993). 
 9. “The notion of contract as a bargaining process arose concomitantly with the 
doctrines of laissez-faire and of the free enterprise system. . . . In the laissez-faire market 
place, economic agents, unfettered by government restrictions, interacted freely. Agents met, 
conferred, and, acting in their own self-interest, contracted.” Lewis A. Kornhauser, Com-
ment, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1152-53 (1976). 
 10. Schwartz states: 
A contracting party’s poverty is commonly thought to militate in four ways against 
enforcing an agreement. First, poverty may impede the buyer’s efforts to purchase 
a “fair” contract. . . . Second, poverty is thought to correlate strongly with a buyer’s 
lack of commercial sophistication. . . . Third, poverty may restrict the flow of 
commercial information to poor consumers. . . . Fourth, poverty may exacerbate 
the consequences of certain contract clauses. An acceleration clause, for example, 
may bear more harshly upon a poor consumer than upon an affluent consumer. 
Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 
1056-57 (1977). 
 11. See P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 27-34 (5th ed. 
1995). Atiyah argues that since the 1980s the United States has witnessed a renaissance of 
classical principles of contract law. Id. at 27. The political emphasis on freedom of choice, 
the value of a free market economy, and a less paternalistic role for the state created an at-
mosphere of classical contract theory. Id. The political and economic climate since the 1980s 
has fostered a resurgence in the ideas of freedom of contract and emphasized less depend-
ence on a benevolent state. Id.  
 12. See KOFFMAN & MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 4. 
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Unconscionability is not intended to erase freedom of contract,13 but to 
assure that the agreement has resulted from real bargaining between parties 
who had freedom of choice and understanding14 and the ability to negotiate 
in a meaningful fashion.15 As Chief Justice Hughes said in Morehead v. 
People of New York ex rel. Tipaldo:16  
  
 13. In Rowe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 385 N.E.2d 566 (N.Y. 1978), the 
New York Court of Appeals highlights the opposition between freedom of contract and pro-
tecting the vulnerable through encouraging fair bargaining. The court asserts the need for the 
doctrine of unconscionability and in doing so states:  
It is . . . far too late in the day to seriously suggest that the law has not made sub-
stantial inroads into such freedom of private contracts. There exists an unavoidable 
tension between the concept of freedom to contract, which has long been basic to 
our socioeconomic system, and the equally fundamental belief that an enlightened 
society must to some extent protect its members from the potentially harsh effects 
of an unchecked free market system. . . . [L]aw has developed the concept of un-
conscionability so as to prevent the unjust enforcement of onerous contractual 
terms which one party is able to impose under the other because of a significant 
disparity in bargaining power. 
Id. at 569. 
 14. It is for this reason that even the most stalwart Libertarians should be in favor of 
invoking the doctrine of unconscionability when applicable. Classical and Libertarian con-
tract theory are both built around the foundational assumption of the existence of a meaning-
ful choice. If one party is defrauded by another and deceived into making an agreement 
detrimental to them in some way, how can this be seen as a meaningful choice? See, e.g., 
MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 133 (1982). Rothbard argues: 
Unfortunately, many libertarians, devoted to the right to make contracts, hold the 
contract itself to be an absolute, and therefore maintain that any voluntary contract 
whatever must be legally enforceable in the free society. Their error is a failure to 
realize that the right to contract is strictly derivable from the right of private prop-
erty, and therefore that the only enforceable contracts (i.e., those backed by the 
sanction of legal coercion) should be those where the failure of one party to abide 
by the contract implies the theft of property from the other party. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). Implicit in Rothbard’s argument is the idea that any contract, which 
when enforced legitimates a theft of private property by one party against another, is equally 
as illegitimate as not enforcing the contract he describes. He defines theft as the taking of 
one’s property without their consent. Id. So, what if a contract is negotiated with such vast 
discrepancies in bargaining power between parties that one party is not, through no fault of 
his own, privy to all that they have agreed to? Since the more powerful party is taking pos-
session of the other’s property without the party’s explicit consent, then is this act not theft as 
well? It does seem to fit under, “Mr. Libertarian,” Murray Rothbard’s definition of theft, and 
thus it appears even Libertarians should find such contracts unconscionable.  
 15. Robyn L. Meadows, Unconscionability as a Contract Policing Device for the 
Elder Client: How Useful Is It?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 741, 744 (2005). Meadows argues that the 
doctrine of unconscionability should be adopted in many situations where the elderly are 
unfairly taken advantage of. See generally id. Specifically, in many contracts with elderly 
parties, the assumptions of classical contract theory do not hold true. See generally id. For 
example:  
There were a number of unconscionability cases involving elderly women and 
dance studios, which frequently involved dance lessons for life at a cost of tens of 
thousands of dollars . . . . In finding these contracts unconscionable, some courts 
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We have had frequent occasion to consider the limitations of liberty of contract. 
While it is highly important to preserve that liberty from arbitrary and capricious 
interference, it is also necessary to prevent its abuse, as otherwise it could be used 
to override all public interests and thus in the end destroy the very freedom of op-
portunity which it is designed to safeguard.17 
Likewise, this Article argues for the court’s increased invocation of 
the doctrine of unconscionability in cases involving unfair contracts. Part I 
explains the doctrine of unconscionability, its theoretical foundations, and 
its legal precedents.18 Part I also clarifies the distinction between the forms 
of procedural and substantive unconscionability, and how the courts subse-
quently apply each form of the doctrine.19 Part II argues that the reason why 
courts should move away from classical contract theory and toward a juris-
prudence embracing the doctrine of unconscionability is because of the 
many faulty assumptions of classical contract theory.20 A summary of evi-
dence from psychological and behavioral sciences, as well as consumer 
research, suggests that humans often behave irrationally and without com-
plete information.21 In other words, because consumers are not fully rational 
and informed, the assumptions of classical contract theory are incorrect, and 
thus the theory crumbles under scrutiny. Part III provides alternative ap-
proaches to enforcing the unconscionability doctrine through a comparative 
lens.22 Specifically, the Article examines unconscionability law in Australia, 
Canada, Germany, and France, and clarifies areas in which the United 
States is both at the forefront and far behind in terms of unconscionability 
standards. Part IV critically evaluates the policing of unconscionability by 
the courts and points out the inherently contradictory approach to uncon-
  
considered the fact that the dance studio knew that it was unlikely that the elderly 
customer would ever reap the full benefit of the contract given the customer’s age 
and physical condition [and the lack of understanding on the part of the elderly 
dancer]. 
Id. at 747. These dance contracts were a result of highly unequal bargaining power. See id. at 
744-45; see, e.g., Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). In this case, the 
court determined there was evidence to support a jury’s finding of unconscionable conduct 
because dance instructors used excessive pressure on a lonely, elderly widow. Bennett, 597 
S.W.2d at 535. By exerting this pressure, the instructors were able to convince the woman to 
purchase excessively expensive dance lessons. Id. As a result, the court held the dance studio 
took advantage of the elderly customer’s vulnerability and the terms of the agreement were 
unbalanced. Id. 
 16. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 627 (1936) (Hughes, J., 
dissenting). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See infra Sections I.A-B. 
 19. See infra Section I.C. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Sections II.B-C. 
 22. See infra Sections III.A-D. 
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scionability since the inception of the doctrine.23 If the courts were con-
cerned with upholding the standards of unconscionability adopted in the 
Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, far 
more court decisions would rule unconscionable provisions and contracts 
null and void.24 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY 
A. Early Forms of Unconscionability 
In its simplest terms, the doctrine of unconscionability permits a court 
to intervene into the contractual relations of parties and modify or reject an 
agreement because part of the contract is unfair.25 The role of unconsciona-
bility in helping parties achieve fair bargains dates back to Roman law, 
which allowed a contracting party to rescind a contract “if the disproportion 
between the values exchanged was greater than two to one.”26 In the United 
States, prior to any uniform adoption of the official doctrine of unconscion-
ability, the eighteenth century courts acknowledged unconscionable agree-
ments.27 As early as 1816, American courts had the equitable power “to set 
aside a contract if ‘in conscience’ it should not be binding.”28 Later in the 
1800s, the courts elaborated on unconscionability and explained uncon-
scionable contracts as ones “such as no man in his senses and not under 
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would 
accept on the other.”29  
  
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-302 (2011).  
 25. Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1819, 
1820 (1994). Darr explains the texts of both § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) and § 208 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognize a court’s authority to 
intervene on behalf of the injured party. Id. at 1828-29. Thus, the doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity is a tool courts use to help contracting parties create contracts with fair terms. See id. 
 26. CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN 
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 599 (7th ed. 2012). 
 27. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443 (1870). In Scott, the 
Court states that “[i]f a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud, 
a court of law will give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its 
letter, but only such as he is equitably entitled to.” Id. at 445. 
 28. Donald R. Price, The Conscience of Judge and Jury: Statutory Unconscionabil-
ity as a Mixed Question of Law and Fact, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 743, 744 n.3 (1981) (quoting Hep-
burn v. Dunlop & Co., 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 179, 197 (1816)). 
 29. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889); see also JOHN EDWARD 
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 96, at 486 (3d ed. 1990). Murray explains it is prac-
tically mandatory for unconscionability discussions to begin with this eighteenth century 
quote, which primed the legal system for further unconscionability discussions. Id. The deci-
sion in Hume was heavily influenced by British case law, specifically the celebrated decision 
in Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 82; 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155. The Earl 
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B. The Uniform Commercial Code and Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
Despite some courts acknowledging the possible existence of a doc-
trine of unconscionability beginning in the 1800s, it was not until 195230 
that the Uniform Commercial Code finally gave courts explicit authoriza-
tion to rule that a contract was unconscionable. Section 2-30231 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.) reads:  
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to en-
force the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof 
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the 
court in making the determination.32 
The Official Comments to U.C.C. § 2-302 further clarify how a court 
would test for unconscionability. They state: 
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and 
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so 
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of 
the making of the contract. . . . The principle is one of the prevention of oppression 
and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior 
bargaining power.33 
Despite its publication in the U.C.C., it took nearly a decade for the 
courts to begin using § 2-302.34 By 1968, fewer than twenty cases were de-
  
court defined unconscionability as a transaction “such as no man in his senses and not under 
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the 
other; which are unequitable and unconscientious bargains; and of such even the common 
law has taken notice.” Id. However, rulings such as in Hume were not common. Rather, the 
common mentality of the courts regarding contracts was that the language of a contract sug-
gests it is a private affair and not a social institution. MURRAY, JR., supra. The judicial sys-
tem, therefore, provides only for their interpretation and should not actively engage in regu-
lating or creating contracts for parties. See, e.g., Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 
U.S. 452, 469-70 (1894); Urian v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 165 A. 21, 24 (Pa. 1933). 
 30. The Code was drafted in the 1940s and 1950s, but the first draft was not pub-
lished until 1952. SINAI DEUTCH, UNFAIR CONTRACTS: THE DOCTRINE OF 
UNCONSCIONABILITY 41 (1977). 
 31. Since its publication, perhaps more has been written about § 2-302 than any 
other single provision of the Code. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON 
CONTRACTS 578 (3d ed. 2004). 
 32. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2011). 
 33. Id. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (citation omitted). 
 34. See Eugene M. Harrington, Unconscionability Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 10 S. TEX. L.J. 203, 205 (1968).  
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cided on the basis of § 2-302.35 But today, although U.S. contract law is 
based largely on common law, the U.C.C., including § 2-302, has been 
adopted by virtually all of the states.36 Furthermore, the intention of § 2-302 
was for the provision to be substantiated by court decisions. The very be-
ginning of the Official Comments to the section states, “[t]his section is 
intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the 
contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable.”37  
Technically, Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies only to the sale of goods.38 
However, the doctrine of unconscionability expands beyond the sale of 
goods. Courts can find contracts unconscionable in secured transactions,39 
contracts between a customer and his bank,40 commercial leases,41 credit 
card fees,42 insurance policy provisions,43 the termination of dealership fran-
chise agreements,44 regulations for tenure and promotion of university facul-
ty,45 and contracts for personal services.46 Officially, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts § 208, asserts unconscionability is accepted as a general 
  
 35. Id.  
 36. After the first publication of § 2-302 of the U.C.C., the ambiguity of the term 
“unconscionability” induced the State of California to initially drop § 2-302 from their adop-
tion of the Code. See Simon Reznikoff, The Unconscionable Controversy, 17 AM. BUS. L.J. 
61, 61 (1979). See also CAL. COM. CODE § 2302 (West 2012) for an in-depth explanation as 
to why the provision was not enacted in California. Also, until 1971, the state of North Caro-
lina also omitted this section from the Code. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-302 (1966) 
for a discussion of why North Carolina did not initially adopt the provision.  
 37. § 2-302 cmt. 1. 
 38. Ostas, supra note 1, at 538. Specifically, the U.C.C. provides that “this Article 
applies to transactions in goods.” U.C.C. § 2-102 (2011). U.C.C. § 2-105 defines goods as 
“all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identi-
fication to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, invest-
ment securities (Article 8) and things in action.” Id. § 2-105. 
 39. Urdang v. Muse, 276 A.2d 397, 401 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1971). 
 40. David v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 287 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Civ. Ct. 1968). 
 41. Earlman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1980). Dec-
ades ago, M. Michael Cramer argued that the doctrine of unconscionability should also apply 
to exculpatory lease contracts by analogy and since tenant–landlord lease contracts have also 
subsequently been deemed unconscionable. M. Michael Cramer, Extension of the Uniform 
Commercial Code’s Unconscionable Contract Provision to Exculpatory Lease Clauses, 5 
AM. BUS. L.J. 287 (1967). 
 42. Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1280, 1296 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
 43. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 181 (Iowa 1975). 
 44. Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1375-77 (Mass. 1980). 
 45. Meehan v. New England Sch. of Law, 522 F. Supp. 484, 494 (D. Mass. 1981), 
aff’d, 705 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 46. Kaye v. Coughlin, 443 S.W.2d 612, 613-14 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Lazan v. 
Huntington Town House, Inc., 332 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271-72 (Suffolk County Ct. 1969) (dealing 
with a contract for the hire of a hall for a Bar Mitzvah party); Nu Dimensions Figure Salons 
v. Becerra, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268, 272 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (concerning a contract for a weight-loss 
program). 
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concept of contracts.47 Thus, the doctrine has been broadened to the point 
where it serves as a protection for consumers in general and not just a provi-
sion in a commercial code designed for merchant-to-merchant transac-
tions.48 
C. Substantive vs. Procedural Unconscionability 
In terms of consumer and merchant transactions, the doctrine of un-
conscionability traditionally can be divided into two forms of unfair bar-
gaining: substantive and procedural unconscionability.49 Typically, uncon-
scionability cases involve both issues.50 Both prongs of the doctrine are en-
  
 47. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states:  
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a 
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any un-
conscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (paraphrasing principally U.C.C. § 2-
302). 
 48. See DEUTCH, supra note 30, at 115-16. 
 49. This framework for unconscionability apparently originated with Arthur Allen 
Leff’s writings discussing unconscionability. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconsciona-
bility and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). Leff ex-
plains that regardless of whether contracts are procedurally or substantively unconscionable, 
contracts obtained by these means should be avoided. Id. at 487-88. Although traditionally 
unconscionability is defined by these two variables since Leff’s work, Daniel T. Ostas pro-
vides another classification of the types of unconscionability. See Ostas, supra note 1, at 541. 
Ostas suggests there are three critical variables in determining if a contract is unconsciona-
ble. Id. First, unconscionability cases may have:  
“[S]uspect clauses,” that have repeatedly generated litigation. Examples [of suspect 
clauses] include warranty disclaimers, nominal price terms, and penalty clauses. 
Although any express term can be a “suspect clause,” one would expect that only 
those clauses which vary from custom would generate a claim of unconscionabil-
ity. The second variable, “relational context,” points to the relevance of both the 
transaction−type and the social setting of an exchange. . . . Examples of relational 
contexts include home−solicitation consumer sales, commercial leases, franchise 
agreements, and physician−patient contracts. Both the fundamental purpose of the 
transaction and the identity of the parties are relevant aspects of the relational con-
text. The [third] variable is the “negotiation process.” Contractual negotiations may 
be tainted with fraud or undue influence, or the parties may have used a form con-
tract with confusing fine print. The means by which a contract is negotiated is al-
ways a critical variable in unconscionability litigation. 
Id. 
 50. That is, the complaining party will allege that a particular clause is unfair and 
that the exchange process through which that clause was derived was tainted. Most courts 
also require some modicum of both procedural and substantive unconscionability to find in 
favor of the vulnerable party. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 164 (2d ed. 1980); Harris v. Green Tree Fin. 
Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). In Harris, the court recognized the need for both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability. Harris, 183 F.3d at 181; see also Leff, supra 
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tirely judge made rather than specified by legislative statute, so courts can 
legitimately modify unconscionability standards without legislative approv-
al.51 
First, substantive unconscionability refers to the unfair terms of the 
contract and the unfair results arising from the transaction, such as overall 
imbalance, unfair price,52 unfair disclaimer, promoting default, waiver of 
  
note 49, at 487. Leff further discusses the requirement of procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability for courts to find a contract unconscionable. Leff, supra note 49, at 489-528. 
However, some courts have disregarded the traditional approach to the doctrine of uncon-
scionability that requires both substantive and procedural problems. For instance, the Arizo-
na Supreme Court concluded that “a claim of unconscionability can be established with a 
showing of substantive unconscionability alone, especially in cases involving either 
price−cost disparity or limitation of remedies.” Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 
51, 59 (Ariz. 1995); see also East Ford Inc. v. Taylor, 2000-IA-01527-SCT (¶22) (Miss. 
2002) (holding that when a term is found procedurally unconscionable, substantive uncon-
scionability is not required); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (App. 
Div. 1998) (“While it is true that, under New York law, unconscionability is generally predi-
cated on the presence of both the procedural and substantive elements, the substantive ele-
ment alone may be sufficient to render the terms of the provision at issue unenforceable.”); 
Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y. 1988) (suggesting that proce-
dural unconscionability may not be necessary if a term is already substantively “outra-
geous”). 
 51. See Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1279. Due to the judicial branch’s ability to mod-
ify unconscionability standards, Korobkin proposes an updated and improved approach to the 
doctrine. Id. He suggests: 
Modifying the unconscionability doctrine to create the closest possible fit between 
the doctrine and either social welfare or buyer welfare requires adherence to four 
principles: (1) Employ the screening device of “procedural unconscionability” to 
sort contract terms into two groups: those highly likely to be efficient, and those 
most likely to be inefficient. (2) Use “substantive unconscionability” analysis to 
identify the terms in the latter category that actually are inefficient. (3) In order to 
minimize “false positives”—decisions that terms are unconscionable when they 
are, in fact, efficient—defer to terms included in form contracts in inconclusive 
cases. (4) In order to provide sellers with an incentive to draft efficient terms even 
when those terms are non-salient, provide substantial remedies to victims when 
terms are found unconscionable by courts.  
Id. 
 52. In unfair price unconscionability cases, one party asserts that the price to be paid 
is grossly disproportionate to the value of the good or service received in exchange. See, e.g., 
Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170, 176 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979). In Murphy, the court 
declared a contract was unconscionable because a buyer paid $1,268 for a television worth 
$499. Id. at 173. Another case affirmed it was unconscionable for a seller to charge $4,322 
for windows that only cost the seller $1,080.50. Sho-Pro of Ind., Inc. v. Brown, 585 N.E.2d 
1357, 1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). In another case, a contract was orally negotiated in Spanish, 
but the contract was written in English. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 
(Civ. Ct. 1966). The written contract charged the buyer three times the value of an appliance, 
and the court subsequently invalidated the contract on unconscionability grounds. Id. at 759. 
After an extensive empirical analysis of price unconscionability cases, Darr notes that high 
price alone is only a necessary condition. Darr, supra note 25, at 1844. He explains: 
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defenses, acceleration of payments, and the repossession of goods without 
prior hearings.53 In other words, substantive unconscionability prevents the 
burdensome allocation of risk on the shoulders of one contracting party.54  
In general, for a contract to be considered substantively unconsciona-
ble, the terms of the contract must unreasonably favor the stronger party.55 
Section 2-302 implies that substantive unconscionability should be evaluat-
ed as of the time the contract was executed,56 and against the general com-
mercial background of the specific case at hand.57 Subsequently, if the con-
tract is so one-sided as to affront the “mores and business practices of the 
time and place,”58 then courts generally find the contract to be substantively 
unconscionable. 
On the other hand, procedural unconscionability examines how each 
term became part of the contract and the actual process of bargaining.59 Pro-
  
Neither process problems nor enforcement problems are sufficient in all cases to 
find unconscionability when price is high. If the contract price is high compared to 
the reference price the court selects, there is evidence of overreaching, and if mar-
ket mechanisms are unlikely to rectify the situation, the courts are likely to inter-
vene. Absent any one of these factors, the opposite result appears likely. 
Id. DiMatteo and Rich explain unfair price contracts are often referred to as “‘per se uncon-
scionab[le]’” because the imbalance in consideration is so severe as to be considered uncon-
scionable on its face. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Uncon-
scionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1091 (2006) 
(quoting M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 789 (1969)). 
The authors further explain that many state legislatures also use the principles of uncon-
scionability to stop unfair price gouging in contracts and sales. Id. at 1091 & n.138. Specifi-
cally, eighteen states, including New York and Florida, have anti-price-gouging statutes with 
sixteen triggered by a declaration of a state of emergency or natural disaster. Id. Under FLA. 
STAT. § 501.160 (2005), it is illegal to charge unconscionable prices for goods or services 
following a declared state of emergency. Id. New York’s price gouging statute is also simi-
lar. Id. For example, in an intriguing recent court battle, claiming defense against an unfair 
price under the doctrine of substantive unconscionability may have been a better route for 
Britney Spears after she objected to the unfair terms in her perfume distribution and royalties 
contract. Stephanie Rabiner, Britney Spears Sued for $10 Million over Perfume Deal, 
FINDLAW BLOG (Apr. 1, 2011, 5:50 AM), 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/celebrity_justice/2011/04/britney-spears-sued-for-10-million-over-
perfume-deal.html?DCMP=NWL-cons_blg-celebrity. As part of the deal to sell her own line 
of perfume, Spears agreed to let Elizabeth Arden market her line of fragrances, and also 
agreed to pay Brand Sense Partners 35% of all royalties for brokering the deal. Id. After a 
while, Spears decided 35% was too high and had all the royalties rerouted to her bank ac-
count. Id. Brand Sense Partners is now suing Spears for $10 million. Id. 
 53. DEUTCH, supra note 30, at 121. 
 54. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Ct. App. 1982).  
 55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981). 
 56. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2011). 
 57. Id. § 2-302 cmt. 1. 
 58. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 59. Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and 
Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 472 (1995). Institutional economics also provides some 
insight into the notion of bargaining power. See JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
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cedural unconscionability is often referred to as “‘bargaining naughti-
ness.’”60 Procedural unconscionability can result from any of the following 
elements: (1) absence of meaningful choice;61 (2) superiority of bargaining 
power;62 (3) the fact that the contract is an adhesion contract;63 (4) unfair 
surprise;64 or (5) sharp practices and deception.65 Additionally, in Johnson v. 
  
CAPITALISM 54 (1924). Commons creates a taxonomy of three types of bargaining power: 
political, economic, and personal. Id. at 51-52, 54, 56. Political power, held uniquely by the 
sovereign, is the right to compel by force. Id. at 51-52. Economic power, the province of 
private property, is the right to withhold property from others. Id. at 54. Personal power is 
derived from the customary expectations generated by role-playing. Id. at 56. He suggests 
that the doctrine of unconscionability is particularly concerned with the abuse of personal 
power. Id. at 58. 
 60. Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why Unconsciona-
bility Has Become a Relic, 105 COM. L.J. 287, 297 (2000) (quoting Leff, supra note 49, at 
487). 
 61. Williams, 350 F.2d at 449. In Williams, the court explained that procedural un-
conscionability “generally [is] recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the 
part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to 
the other party.” Id.; see also Telecom Int’l Am., Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 280 F.3d 175, 194 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003). A lack of 
meaningful choice has also been used to regulate the terms contained in standard form or 
adhesion contracts. Such contracts may indicate a lack of meaningful agreement. W. David 
Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1974). For 
a detailed discussion of the problems associated with standard form agreements and uncon-
scionability, see Id. 
 62. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121-22 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The California Supreme Court opined that an inequality of bargaining power constitutes 
“oppressive unconscionability.” Id. The opinion states: “Inequality of bargaining power . . . 
results in no real negotiation and ‘an absence of meaningful choice.’” Id. at 122 (quoting 
Williams, 350 F.2d at 449); see also Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886 
(N.H. 1964).  
 63. See, e.g., Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (Ct. App. 1976). 
In Wheeler, the court found that an admission form requiring a patient to arbitrate claims 
with the hospital was an adhesion contract and was unconscionable. Id. at 793. The court 
stated: “Enforceability depends upon whether the terms of which the adherent was unaware 
are beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person or are oppressive or uncon-
scionable.” Id. at 783. 
 64. Surprise occurs most frequently when sellers hide supposedly agreed-upon con-
tract terms from the consumer. See A & M Produce, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122. “[F]or instance, 
unfair surprise can arise from the use of fine print (illegible wording) or from incomprehen-
sible wording (legal terminology) . . . .” DEUTCH, supra note 30, at 121. Unfair surprise can 
also result “because the limited warranty was delivered to the customer only after the trans-
action had already been concluded.” Id.; see also Leff, supra note 49, at 499-500. Leff ex-
plains unfair surprise arises when there is the presence of misleading bargaining conduct. Id. 
A court looking for unfair surprise then considers such factors as “hidden provisions, unintel-
ligible language, and surreptitious attempts to contract out key provisions.” Omar Anorga, 
Music Contracts Have Musicians Playing in the Key of Unconscionability, 24 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 739, 745 (2003). 
 65. 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 18:10 (Richard 
A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2010). 
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Mobil Oil Corp., the court provided a typical listing of factors to consider 
when evaluating procedural unconscionability.66 Falling under the proce-
dural prong of unconscionability are factors bearing upon the “‘real and 
voluntary meeting of the minds’ of the contracting parties: age, education, 
intelligence, business acumen and experience, relative bargaining power, 
who drafted the contract, whether the terms were explained to the weaker 
party, [and] whether alterations in the printed terms were possible.”67  
Unequal bargaining power is not merely a form of procedural uncon-
scionability, but one of the most common forms of unconscionability em-
ployed by the courts.68 Courts sometimes find unequal bargaining power on 
the basis of evidence that the seller is a large company and the buyer is a 
small company or individual.69 Additionally, unequal bargaining can be the 
result of a “situation-specific monopoly.”70 Situation-specific monopolies 
occur when a seller publicizes a product’s price and encourages a potential 
buyer to make an investment in time or money in preparing to purchase the 
product.71 “Then, after the buyer’s investment . . . has been made, the seller 
presents a set of adhesive form terms that the buyer must sign or [else] for-
feit his initial investment.”72 In these ways, courts have the means to find 
contractual provisions procedurally unconscionable due to unequal bargain-
ing power.  
  
 66. 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
 67. Id. (quoting Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971)). Further-
more, the court in Nasco, Inc. v. Public Storage, Inc. affirmed these considerations of uncon-
scionability. No. 92-12731-RCL, 1995 WL 337072, *4 (D. Mass. May 20, 1995). The deci-
sion also explains courts may take into account whether the party claiming unconscionability 
was represented by counsel and whether the questionable clause was obscure or buried in 
fine print. Id. 
 68. See Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1279.  
 69. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861 (W. Va. 
1998) (quoting Art’s Flower Shop, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 413 S.E.2d 670, 
675 (W. Va. 1991) (footnote omitted)) (stating “[t]he relative positions of the parties, a na-
tional corporate lender on one side and elderly, unsophisticated consumers on the other, were 
‘grossly unequal’”). However, some courts have held that size of contracting parties is not a 
relevant factor in determining unconscionability. See, e.g., Mayflower Transit, Inc. v. Ann 
Arbor Warehouse Co., 892 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 (S.D. Ind. 1995). 
 70. Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1264; see, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 
598, 601 (N.J. 1973). In this case, a service station dealer who invested in building his busi-
ness and clientele had little choice but to agree to Shell’s terms when it was time to renew his 
lease with the oil company. Id.; see also Sun Trust Bank v. Sun Int’l Hotels Ltd., 184 F. 
Supp. 2d 1246, 1259-62 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Powertel, Inc v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 574-76 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 71. See Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1264. 
 72. Id. 
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D. Problems with U.C.C. § 2-302 
Controversial since its inception,73 much of the debate surrounding the 
doctrine of unconscionability in contract law results from a lack of clear 
meaning of the term.74 That is, the Code never provides an exact definition 
of “unconscionability.”75 Section 2-302 allows the courts the option of not 
enforcing a clause or a contract or to limit its application when they find as 
a matter of law that a contract or clause is unconscionable.76 However, the 
Code’s clarification of what deems a contract “unconscionable” is circular 
and vague.77 Section 2-302’s Official Comments provide no more guidance 
for courts.78  
  
 73. In fact, considerable controversy arose concerning § 2-302 even before the pub-
lication of the first official text in 1952. See H.L. Douglass, A Discussion on SALES as Pro-
posed in the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 JOURNAL 808, 810 (1950); Alfred T. Goodwin, 
How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code Would Affect the Law of Sales in Ore-
gon, 30 OR. L. REV. 139, 213-15 (1951). Goodwin opposed the doctrine of unconscionability 
due to its lack of workable procedures for enforcing the doctrine. Goodwin, supra, at 213-15. 
 74. See, e.g., J. Francis Ireton, The Commercial Code, 22 MISS. L.J. 273, 280 (1951). 
Ireton argued unconscionability suffered from a lack of a clear definition. Id. 
 75. This lack of a clear definition caused many to believe that unconscionability 
would be completely ineffectual. See Leff, supra note 49, at 558-59. 
 76. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
369 (1960). 
 77. Some legal scholars have attempted to defend the lack of definition for uncon-
scionability in the Code. See, e.g., Ellinghaus, supra note 52, at 759. Professor Ellinghaus 
suggests the doctrine of unconscionability is not a rule, but a standard. Id. Naturally, stand-
ards create definitional problems associated with their application and use. Id. He compares 
the lack of a strict definition to the discussion of the standard of good faith in the law. Id. at 
800. Standards, such as unconscionability, provide a continuum that gives the courts the 
needed flexibility to apply the law to a diverse set of cases. Id. at 759-60. Without this flexi-
bility, courts could not adequately employ the doctrine of unconscionability. See Timothy 
Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague, 7 LEGAL THEORY 379, 380-85 (2001) (arguing vague 
laws are an important part of every legal system); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 272-
76 (2d ed. 1994) (responding to the problem of vagueness in laws by claiming that the law 
gives judges discretion to decide issues that the law does not determine). Thus, we would 
deem unconscionability cases as an area of the law allowing discretion of the courts to clarify 
the vagueness of the law. 
 78. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2011). Although the comments to the U.C.C. are “offi-
cial,” often state legislatures do not enact them when adopting the Code. The Code’s drafters 
provided comments “to promote uniformity” and “to safeguard against misconstruction.” 
U.C.C. Article 1: Official Comments, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/1/general_comment.bak, (last visited May 31, 2013). How-
ever, at least in the area of unconscionability, this uniformity has not been achieved. See E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.9, at 34-35 (3d ed. 1999). Many in the legal communi-
ty think the distinction between “rules” and “standards” undermines the law. See Daniel T. 
Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic Visions of Richard 
A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193, 206-07 (1998) (citing MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 3-5 (1987)). Professor Kelman explains “the law is replete with a 
host of ‘fundamental contradictions.’ For example, in one context the law will hold that 
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Much of the controversy and disagreement regarding the doctrine of 
unconscionability stems from an underlying disagreement about two con-
cepts of liberty.79 One concept of liberty, often termed “positive freedom,” 
aims to allow people “‘to do what they would do if they knew enough, or 
were always at their best, instead of yielding to irrational motives.’”80 The 
second concept of liberty, often called “[n]egative freedom,” attempts to 
preserve a sphere of individual autonomy within which an individual can 
make his own decisions without assistance.81 Classical contract theory is 
based on a concept of individual liberty that is consistent with the concept 
of negative freedom, whereas the doctrine of unconscionability is more con-
sistent with positive freedom.82  
E. Remedies for Unconscionability  
In terms of what happens after a court rules a contract is unconsciona-
ble, the unconscionability doctrine “operates as a shield and not as a 
sword.”83 In other words, parties can protect themselves against enforce-
ment of an unconscionable provision in a contract, but cannot obtain dam-
ages for having been subject to an unconscionable offer.84 Furthermore, a 
party cannot seek restitution for compliance with an unconscionable con-
tract.85  
Although the doctrine of unconscionability has established a better de-
fense against unfair contracts than the pre-Code doctrines, the lack of clear 
guidelines for applying the actual doctrine prevents its widespread use and 
acceptance.86 We now look to the courts for developing guidelines to create 
fair contracts and invoke the doctrine of unconscionability and positive 
freedom. The doctrine of unconscionability allows courts to either deny 
enforceability of such contracts or to modify the terms of a contract to alle-
viate unconscionable portions.87  
  
‘rules’ are to be preferred to ‘standards’; yet, in other contexts one finds an equally potent set 
of precedents that holds that standards are to be preferred to rules.” Id. (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted). 
 79. See Philip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Uncon-
scionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1514-15 & n.9 (2003).  
 80. Id. at 1514-15 (quoting THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 486 (Ted 
Honderich ed., 1995)). 
 81. Id. at 1515. 
 82. Id. at 1519-22. 
 83. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Ac-
commodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 229 (2000).  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. See DEUTCH, supra note 30, at 77. 
 87. This distinction is similar to the distinction between protection of entitlements 
by a property rule and a liability rule. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property 
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II. QUESTIONABLE ASSUMPTIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY 
A. Addressing Those Opposed to Unconscionability 
The most prominent opposition against unconscionability revolves 
around the idea that classical contract theory is desirable because of a con-
tract’s reliance on market transactions.88 A fundamental tenant of contract 
law is that parties can contract on whatever terms they choose because the 
market depends on such transactions.89 But opponents of unconscionability 
must be reminded that freedom of contract in the United States is not unlim-
ited. Courts have historically employed a number of traditional theories—
such as duress, fraud, and lack of capacity—to police contracting parties 
and to alleviate the harshness of the “buyer beware” attitude of the law.90 In 
employing these theories, we see courts acknowledging the need to protect 
the vulnerable by avoiding free market liberalism.  
Some opponents of unconscionability also argue the doctrine is a form 
of paternalism.91 But consider the following manner in which unconsciona-
bility cases arise: the party who invokes the unconscionability doctrine ac-
tively opposes the enforcement of the contract. Therefore, how could rescis-
  
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089, 1092 (1972). Furthermore, Richard Craswell has applied this distinction to the entitle-
ments established by the doctrine of unconscionability. See Richard Craswell, Property Rules 
and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44-63 
(1993).  
 88. See, e.g., Harry R. Levy, A Study of the Uniform Commercial Code—Sales, 58 
COM. L.J. 329, 331 (1953). Levy describes § 2-302 and the doctrine of unconscionability as 
troublesome because of the possible conflict between the court’s sense of conscience and 
freedom of contract. Id. 
 89. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & 
ECON. 293, 315 (1975). Epstein explains that public policy requires men of full age and 
competent understanding to have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts 
when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and enforced by the courts. Id. 
(citing Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, (1875) 19 L.R.Eq. 462 at 465). 
 90. Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying 
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer 
Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 941 (1986). 
 91. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 519, 535-37 (1988) (characterizing unconscionability as a paternalist doctrine and 
further noting judicial reluctance to employ it effectively); Paul Burrows, Analyzing Legal 
Paternalism, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 489, 501 (1995); Robin L. West, Taking Preferences 
Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659, 695 (1990); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare 
State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on 
the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 296-97 (1995) (stating there is a “wide-
spread feeling among contract law scholars that paternalistic attitudes account for some 
judges’ use of the unconscionability doctrine” and defending the unconscionability doctrine 
as promoting the welfare system’s goals). 
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sion be paternalistic since that is what the party wills?92 Unlike many of the 
commonly cited examples of paternalism, such as drug prohibitions or seat-
belt laws, the protected party does not resist or oppose the result or the pro-
cedure and therefore unconscionability is not a form of paternalism.93 In 
unconscionability cases, the relevant agent actively endorses the supposedly 
paternalistic conduct.94  
Further, it is important to note that many areas of law aim to provide 
paternalistic protection for buyers or weaker parties. For example, 
“[p]roducts liability law determines a seller’s responsibility for physical 
injury caused by its products.”95 Landlord–tenant law defines the landlord’s 
liability for unsafe or inadequate housing and limits the landlord’s powers 
“vis-à-vis tenants who damage the premises or are delinquent in paying the 
rent.”96 Additionally, “[d]ebtor-creditor law limits the analogous powers 
exercised by creditors outside the rental housing market” and protects debt-
ors from gross inequalities of bargaining power.97  
The doctrine of unconscionability, like the theories of duress, fraud, or 
products liability law, does not erase a party’s ability to contract freely. Ra-
ther, the unconscionability doctrine ensures that parties can actually contract 
freely and fairly. At least since John Stuart Mill, social theorists have 
acknowledged that some forms of paternalism can be reconciled with the 
principles of freedom of choice and contract.98 That is, some types of gov-
ernment interference with an individual’s free choices protect the individu-
al’s well-being without being detrimental to individual liberty.99 One such 
  
 92. See Shiffrin, supra note 83, at 229.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribu-
tion in Buyer−Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 361 (1991). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See generally DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE 
MORAL BOUNDS OF BENEVOLENCE (1986); Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 MONIST 64, 64-
84 (1972). Dworkin’s argument is focused on the compatibility of paternalism and liberty. 
Dworkin, supra. He treats it as altogether obvious that if your head is screwed on straight, 
liberty and paternalism are compatible when not being paternalistic would be harmful to 
yourself. Id. Then the article argues that there are also grounds (warrants) for paternalism to 
make a person happier, more wise or more right. Id.; see also Christine Pierce, Hart on Pa-
ternalism 35 ANALYSIS 205, 205-07 (1975) (explaining how Hart uses a version of Mill’s 
harm principle to argue against those readings of Mill that are totally anti-paternalistic). 
 99. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR 
APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY bk. V, at 966-67 (W.J. Ashley ed., 1909) (1848). For 
example, Mill suggests maximum hour regulations are such an example. Id. at 963. These 
measures are “required, not to overrule the judgment of individuals respecting their own 
interest, but to give effect to that judgment: they being unable to give effect to it except by 
concert, which concert again cannot be effectual unless it receives validity and sanction from 
the law.” Id. 
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type of government interference that is not detrimental to individual liberty 
is the doctrine of unconscionability.  
Additionally, opponents of unconscionability suggest that in finding 
contracts unfair, courts essentially alter the overall meaning of specific con-
tracts.100 However, it is important to note that of the remedial options gener-
ally considered appropriate by courts, reformation of the single offending 
term in a contract is the least disruptive method of correction.101 In other 
words, “[a] court seeking to reform an unconscionable term effectively re-
writes that term, but the contractual relationship between the buyer and sell-
er otherwise proceeds as the contract provides.”102 Therefore, the amending 
of unconscionable contracts is not overbearing, but often narrowly tailored 
to specific unfair provisions.  
The biggest problem with the opposition to the doctrine of uncon-
scionability is that the argument rests on many of the assumptions of classi-
cal contract theory discussed in the introduction of this Article. That is, con-
tract theory assumes: (1) people are rational actors; and (2) have access to 
perfect information.103 
B. Contracting Parties Are Rational Actors? 
The basic ideology of the market economy presumes that contracts are 
made by rational and informed parties.104 Only if this prerequisite of our 
thought processes is fulfilled may one argue that the provisions of our cur-
rent system of contract law will lead to balanced contracts and therefore the 
doctrine of unconscionability is unnecessary.105 As the Nobel prize-winning 
psychologist Daniel Kahneman explains, there are two types of thought 
processes affecting our ability to be rational: “System 1” and “System 2.”106 
  
 100. Brown, supra note 60, at 288 (citing 2 HAW K L A ND UCC SE R IE S § 2-302:1 (1997-
1999)). 
 101. See Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1286. 
 102. Id.  
 103. See infra Sections II.B-C. 
 104. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Re-
moving the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1053, 1053 
(2000). 
 105. Granted, there are some contracts that will not be enforced no matter how volun-
tary, rational, and informed the parties’ choices may have been. For example, a contract to 
become another’s slave is unenforceable. So is a contract to sell one’s babies. Often these 
absolute prohibitions are difficult to reconcile with a general principle of freedom of con-
tract. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y, Sept. 1986, at 179; Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
970, 970 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Market−Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 
1850-51 (1987). 
 106. Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded 
Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 698 (2003). Similarly, other scholars have used 
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System 1 processes create actions that are automatic, associative, implicit 
(not available to introspection), emotionally charged, governed by habit, 
and difficult to control or modify.107 Conversely, System 2 processes are 
slow, effortful, rule governed, relatively flexible, and more likely to be con-
sciously monitored and deliberately controlled.108 As rational adults, we 
might assume our judgments result from System 2 processes. However, a 
plethora of knowledge and recent publications by influential legal scholars 
suggest we should alter our current system of legal analysis in lieu of find-
ings about human irrationality from the fields of biology109 and cognitive 
psychology.110 
1. Child or Adult? 
Classical contract theory equates being a rational contracting party 
with being a rational adult.111 In other words, adults are ipso facto assumed 
to be rational because of their age and experience. Most areas of law, eco-
nomics, and government provide special safety and regulations for any 
transactions involving children because they lack age and experience.112 
That is, children are considered a protected class and not expected to be 
rational parties.113 For example, we do not permit children to sign contracts 
  
terms like “experiential” and “rational” in place of System 1 and System 2. See, e.g., Paul 
Slovic et al., Rational Actors or Rational Fools: Implications of the Affect Heuristic for 
Behavioral Economics, 31 J. SOCIO-ECON. 329, 330 (2002) (citing Seymour Epstein, Integra-
tion of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 710 
(1994)). 
 107. See Kahneman, supra note 106, at 698. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Margaret Gruter, Law in Sociobiological Perspective, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 181 (1977); E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 595 (1997); Richard A. Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a 
Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665 (1980); Bailey Kuklin, Evolution, Politics and Law, 
38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129 (2004); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to 
Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996). 
 110. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Ap-
proach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 
104; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 113 (1996). 
 111. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 104, at 1053. 
 112. “Children” is sometimes used, but it is more common to find the terms “infancy” 
or “minority” used to describe people under twenty-one or eighteen. Hillary Rodham, Chil-
dren Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487, 488-94 (1973); see also Victoria Slade, The 
Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A Useful Vestige, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 613, 
616-19 (2011). 
 113. Slade, supra note 112, at 619-20. Slade explains: “Many areas of law recognize 
that minors do not have the same capacity for decision making as adults. For instance, in 
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because they lack the capacity to engage in bargaining, and the contract is 
skewed in favor of the more powerful agent.114 In tort law, the attractive 
nuisance doctrine protects children from hazardous land through the child-
proofing of property.115 Furthermore, the government places age restrictions 
on the purchasing of alcohol, cigarettes, and pornography.116 The assump-
tion behind all of these regulations is that children are among the most vul-
nerable and irrational in society, thus requiring our protection.117 
While the law generally creates age thresholds for when a child be-
comes an adult, psychological and behavioral research suggests that perhaps 
the distinction between child and adult is not so clear because adults are not 
as rational as they might believe.118 In other words, just because someone 
can legally be deemed an adult does not mean that person automatically 
possesses the level of rationality required to be a contracting party.119 For 
instance, one factor suggesting many adults are closer to children than once 
supposed is the fact that many adults lack emotional control.120 To have a 
complete picture of human rationality, we have to unravel the role emotions 
play.121 We expect children to act out rashly when they do not get what they 
desire and to have outbursts of rage or sadness in public places. Conversely, 
adults have disciplined themselves not to act on these emotions.122 Yet in-
creasing instances of road rage behaviors such as tailgating, obscene ges-
  
criminal law, a minor’s consent to sexual contact does not absolve that minor’s sexual part-
ner. . . . In tort law, the reasonable person standard is altered for children.” Id. 
 114. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 212-13 (1995). Eisenberg explains: “Lack of capacity exists when a 
party is not competent to understand the nature and consequences of his acts. . . . [H]e cannot 
make adequate judgments concerning his utility.” Id. at 212. 
 115. See Peters v. Bowman, 47 P. 113, 114 (Cal. 1896). 
 116. For example, states impose a smoking age for tobacco products. Some advocate 
for raising the smoking age in states to twenty-one, as is the case with alcohol. See Sajjad 
Ahmad & John Billimek, Limiting Youth Access to Tobacco: Comparing the Long-Term 
Health Impacts of Increasing Cigarette Excise Taxes and Raising the Legal Smoking Age to 
21 in the United States, 80 HEALTH POL’Y 378, 378 (2007). 
 117. See Tamar Schapiro, What Is a Child?, 109 ETHICS 715, 715-16 (1999). Schapiro 
explains that society places special regulations on children to protect, nurture, and educate 
them, regardless of whether they want such protections. Id. at 716. The author argues that 
perhaps we should extend some of those protections to adults as well, as they may not be as 
drastically different from children as we presume. Id. 
 118. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See David Kennedy, Reconstructing Childhood, 14 THINKING: J. PHIL. CHILD. 29 
(1998).  
 121. The number of researchers exploring the roles of emotions in decision processes 
has increased in recent years. See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, 
REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994); George Loewenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role 
of Affect in Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 619, 619 (Richard J. 
Davidson, Klaus R. Scherer & H. Hill Goldsmith eds., 2002). 
 122. Loewenstein & Lerner, supra note 121, at 619. 
 Contingent Assumptions of Contract Theory 231 
tures, and cutting off other drivers indicate that even some adults cannot 
control their emotions in all situations.123 Another example of adults inap-
propriately acting on emotions includes violent acts of aggression in sport-
ing-event fights and bar brawls.124 Although one indicator of an adult psyche 
is the ability to repress emotional outbursts, we see that in some situations 
the rationality of adults breaks down and emotions guide behavior in a 
child-like fashion. 
Another distinction society draws between a child and an adult re-
volves around happiness. That is, children do not know what is good for 
them or what will make them happy, but adults do. However, interdiscipli-
nary evidence suggests that even adults do not understand how to achieve 
the happiness they desire. For instance, economic and marketing data sug-
gest “that as national income grows, people do not spend their extra money 
in ways that yield significant and lasting increases in measured satisfac-
tion.”125 That is, the subjective well-being of society will be higher with a 
greater balance of inconspicuous consumption, such as time with family and 
friends, less traffic congestion, more vacation time, and favorable job char-
acteristics.126 Yet, the spending pattern of consumers does not create these 
situations that would lead to greater happiness.127 Rather, many adults be-
lieve money can buy happiness and thus engage in conspicuous consump-
tion, which can negatively affect a person’s overall happiness.128  
  
 123. See Bruce S. Sharkin, Road Rage: Risk Factors, Assessment, and Intervention 
Strategies, 82 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 191 (2004). Sharkin discusses The American Automo-
bile Association Foundation for Traffic Safety’s report citing that aggressive incidents of 
drivers behind the wheel increased roughly 50% between the years of 1990 to 1996. Id. at 
191. This lack of emotional control on the part of adults suggests that certain situations alter 
one’s ability to behave normally or rationally. Id. at 191-98. 
 124. See, e.g., Kit R. Roane, 2 Jets and Ex-Teammate Are Arrested, N.Y. TIMES (July 
11, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/11/nyregion/2-jets-and-ex-teammate-are-
arrested.html; Howard Bath, Wiring Pathways to Replace Aggression, 14 RECLAIMING 
CHILD. & YOUTH 249, 250 (2006). Bath, a psychologist, explains there are two types of hu-
man aggression: (1) reactive, characterized by strong and immediate emotions; and (2) pro-
active, characterized by planning and intent. Bath, supra, at 250. Whereas with proactive 
aggression, “the person’s behaviours are more goal directed and suggest more thinking brain 
processing,” people experiencing reactive aggression cannot relate to logic or reason until a 
person’s thinking brain “resumes control.” Id. 
 125. See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN 
ERA OF EXCESS 72, 77 (1999) (summarizing scientific evidence suggesting that the correla-
tion between income and happiness is extremely weak). 
 126. Id. at 90. 
 127. Id. at 78. 
 128. Id. at 77; see also Richard A. Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the 
Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence, in NATIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS IN ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MOSES ABRAMOVITZ 89, 118 (Paul A. David & Melvin W. 
Reder eds., 1974) (demonstrating that higher income in the United States is not systematical-
ly accompanied by greater happiness and concluding that economic growth does not improve 
the human condition); Richard A. Easterlin, Does Money Buy Happiness?, 30 PUB. INT. 3, 4 
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Much of an adult’s inability to procure happiness is a result of poor 
forecasting about the future. Unfortunately, research indicates people are 
generally poor predictors of their future states.129 This poor predicting abil-
ity about their future happiness leads to a dissonance between what is antic-
ipated and what is experienced.130 The high divorce rates of adults are just 
one example of evidence suggesting we cannot so easily attain the happi-
ness we desire.131 The implication of the evidence is that although adults, 
unlike children, are supposed to know the means to their ends of happiness, 
even adults may not actually behave in a manner conducive to achieving 
those goals. 
2. Consumer Behavior 
Another dimension in which adults may not act completely rationally 
concerns consumer behavior patterns.132 There is a large body of research 
indicating the irrationality of consumers in purchasing goods and services.133 
For instance, does food taste better when served on fine china rather than 
paper plates? Rationally speaking, what the food is served on should not 
affect the actual taste or quality of the food.134 Unfortunately, packaging still 
does affect a person’s perception of the food’s taste.135 Research also sug-
gests that the color of a food is empirically effective in influencing percep-
tions of flavor intensity, despite the fact it should not rationally affect fla-
vor.136 Color is manipulated by firms to signal freshness and taste, and a 
  
(1973); Otis Dudley Duncan, Does Money Buy Satisfaction?, 2 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 267, 
267-68 (1975) (studying the influence of income on happiness in Detroit, Michigan). Specif-
ically, although the real median household income in the Detroit area increased by 40% 
between 1955 and 1971, there was no change in the satisfaction with the standard of living 
among wives. Duncan, supra, at 268.  
 129. See, e.g., Vanessa M. Patrick, Deborah J. MacInnis & C. Whan Park, Not as 
Happy as I Thought I’d Be? Affective Misforecasting and Product Evaluations, 33 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 479, 479 (2007). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 480 (“Marriage, for instance, involves making a forecast of how happy one 
is likely to feel about one’s spouse ‘till death do you part.’”). 
 132. See Aradhna Krishna & Maureen Morrin, Does Touch Affect Taste? The Percep-
tual Transfer of Product Container Haptic Cues, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 807, 807 (2008). 
 133. Id. (analyzing the ways in which buyers often equate the packaging or delivery 
of a product with judgments about the products themselves). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. JoAndrea Hoegg & Joseph W. Alba, Taste Perception: More than Meets the 
Tongue, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 490, 490 (2007). Specifically, Hoegg and Alba found the tint 
of orange juice had a huge effect on the taster’s perceptions of taste demonstrating that color 
dominates taste. Id. at 491. In the experiment, the subjects were given two cups of the same 
Tropicana orange juice, with one cup darkened with food coloring. Id. at 492. The members 
of the researcher’s sample group perceived differences in taste that in actuality did not exist; 
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consumer’s perceptions of quality are influenced by this color manipulation 
rather than actual indicators of quality.137 These studies indicate that alt-
hough consumers are expected to be rational actors, a body of evidence 
suggests their behavior indicates otherwise.  
3. Superstition 
Furthermore, the high frequency of superstitious beliefs in society is 
also evidence of irrational consumer behavior.138 For example, market deci-
sions are governed by everything from lucky numbers to feng shui.139 Simi-
larly, nearly a billion dollars is lost in the U.S. business world on each Fri-
day the thirteenth due to superstition.140 A perfectly informed actor would 
not spend his money on products offering to do things they cannot possibly 
do, like increase luck or cast positive energy based on the arrangement of a 
room. This evidence furthers the idea that we should not unquestioningly 
assume adults are rational actors. 
4. Cognitive Biases 
In addition to a lack of emotional control, behavioral research suggests 
an adult’s capacity to reason is also subject to many of the predictable cog-
nitive biases141 that children engage in.142 For instance, instead of reasoning 
logically, adults have the tendency to commit confirmation bias, or believe 
evidence as confirming their own previously established views.143 The pri-
  
however, when the subjects were given two cups of orange juice that were the same color but 
with one cup sweetened with sugar, the same people failed to perceive taste differences. Id. 
at 493. A rational consumer would undoubtedly notice a change in taste and not be affected 
by color, but Hoegg and Alba’s research suggests that consumers do not always behave 
rationally. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Thomas Kramer & Lauren Block, Conscious and Nonconscious Components 
of Superstitious Beliefs in Judgment and Decision Making, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 783, 783 
(2008). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. For a business law perspective of cognitive biases, see Ramona L. Paetzold & 
Steven L. Willborn, Employer (Ir)rationally and the Demise of Employment References, 30 
AM. BUS. L.J. 123 (1992). 
 142. See Tamara R. Piety, “Merchants of Discontent”: An Exploration of the Psy-
chology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 377, 402-03 (2001). 
 143. Id. at 402; see also Carole Hill, Amina Memon & Peter McGeorge, The Role of 
Confirmation Bias in Suspect Interviews: A Systematic Evaluation, 13 LEGAL & 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 357, 358 (2008) (examining the extent to which police officers 
presume suspects to be guilty prior to interviewing them). When police officers engage in 
confirmation bias, they may conduct their interviews by seeking information that confirms 
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macy and recency biases also cause people to place a greater importance on 
events that happen at the beginning or end of a sequence.144 Furthermore, 
the marketing of products to adults relies heavily on availability and repre-
sentativeness biases.145 In other words, even adults (1) have the tendency to 
calculate probabilities on the basis of the most available information; and 
(2) often rely on the most vivid facts and attribute a greater weight to known 
occurrences than is representatively appropriate.146 Another widespread 
cognitive bias adults regularly engage in is known as the denomination ef-
fect. Specifically, the denomination effect refers to the tendency to spend 
more money when it is denominated in small amounts (e.g. coins) rather 
than large amounts.147 These cognitive biases demonstrate only a small frac-
tion of the biases in which humans engage during decision-making. The 
chart below illustrates more examples of adults engaging in irrational be-
havior due to cognitive biases.  
  
the guilty hypothesis and avoid information disconfirming the alternative hypothesis. Hill, 
Memon & McGeorge, supra, at 358. This confirmation bias in interrogation may prove to be 
detrimental to the entirety of the legal system if suspects are in essence “guilty until proven 
innocent.” See also Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon 
in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998). Nickerson describes the confirma-
tion bias of adults as “the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to exist-
ing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.” Id. 
 144. See Dirk D. Steiner & Jeffrey S. Rain, Immediate and Delayed Primacy and 
Recency Effects in Performance Evaluation, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 136 (1989). In their 
study, 333 undergraduate students viewed four videotaped lectures in one session. Id. at 136. 
“Overall performance ratings showed a recency effect when good performance occurred 
last.” Id. 
 145. See Piety, supra note 142, at 403. This bias infiltrates commercials through the 
concept of “brand identification.” Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Chana Joffe-Walt, Why We Spend Coins Faster than Bills, NPR (May 12, 
2009, 3:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104063298. Joffe-
Walt summarizes the recent studies conducted by economists Priya Raghubir and Joydeep 
Srivastava, who did a series of experiments in the United States and China regarding the 
denomination effect. Id. Results confirmed the denomination bias hypothesis, and “showed 
people were much more willing to spend the same sum of money if they had smaller denom-
inations instead of one large bill.” Id.; see also Alex Mindlin, A Reluctance to Break the 
Large Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/business/30drill.html?_r=0. Mindlin’s article also dis-
cusses Srivastava’s paper, which is soon to be published in The Journal of Consumer Re-
search and investigates the denomination effect. Mindlin, supra.  
In one study, college students who had been given four quarters were more likely 
to buy proffered candy—and bought more of it—than students given a single dollar 
bill. In another, 20 percent of Chinese women given a single 100-yuan note 
($14.66) chose not to spend the money on an array of shampoo, bedding and other 
household goods—but the rate of abstention was only 9.3 percent among women 
given the same amount of money in smaller notes. 
Id. 
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Table 1: Irrational Behavior of Adults 
Cognitive Bias Irrational Behavior 
Base-Rate Fallacy148 The tendency of people to be influenced more 
by salient, individual cases rather than by 
base rates drawn from larger samples.149 
Contrast Effect150 The enhancement or diminishing effect of a 
judgment when compared with a recently ob-
served contrasting object.151 
Endowment 
Effect152 
The tendency of people to demand more to 
give up something that they own than they 
  
 148. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 
PSYCHOL. REV. 237, 237 (1973); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: 
Descriptive, Normative, and Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 1 
(1996). 
 149. See Brian H. Bornstein, The Impact of Different Types of Expert Scientific Tes-
timony on Mock Jurors’ Liability Verdicts, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 429, 442-43 (2004). 
Bornstein discusses how juries tend to give inappropriate weight to anecdotal evidence and 
ignore the most statistically significant data and examines how an expert’s anecdotal testi-
mony that is virtually worthless with respect to its probative value exerts a greater effect than 
the scientifically more probative experimental evidence. Id. at 442; see also Brad E. Bell & 
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Vivid Persuasion in the Courtroom, 49 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 
659, 659 (1985). Belle and Loftus discuss why vivid information presented at trial may re-
ceive more weight than relatively pallid information. Bell & Loftus, supra, at 659. The rea-
sons why juries give inappropriate weight to anecdotal evidence may be due to greater atten-
tion or memorability. Id. at 661-62. 
 150. See Albert Pepitone & Mark DiNubile, Contrast Effects in Judgments of Crime 
Severity and the Punishment of Criminal Violators, 33 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
448, 457-58 (1976) (discussing the influence of the contrast effect on judgments about the 
severity of different crimes). 
 151. See Dennis M. O’Reilly et al., The Effects of Immediate Context on Auditors’ 
Judgments of Loan Quality, 23 AUDITING 89, 89, 102 (2004) (examining “whether auditors, 
when making a series of similar, independent judgments [about loans] are non-normatively 
influenced by their earlier judgments,” and finding that auditors “conclude very different 
outcomes, [are] subject to considerable bias [and contrast effect], and exhibit poor calibration 
given different immediate contexts”). 
 152. See Owen D. Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A New 
Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935, 1935, 1939 (2008). Jones 
and Brosnan discuss “[r]ecent work at the intersection of law and behavioral biology [that 
suggests] numerous contexts in which legal thinking could benefit by integrating knowledge 
from behavioral biology.” Id. at 1935. The authors define the endowment effect as a “phe-
nomenon that appears to underlie some seemingly irrational pricing of property and to there-
by impede efficient exchange.” Id. at 1939. “Because the effect seems inconsistent with 
standard neoclassical, rational actor, [and] expected-utility theory economy,” it is questiona-
ble whether we should ascribe to the law doctrines relying on these assumptions. Id.  
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would be willing to pay for that same good if 
they did not own it.153 
Loss Aversion The tendency to prefer avoiding losses above 
acquiring gains.154 
Optimism Bias155 The tendency of people to believe that their 
own probability of facing a bad outcome is 
lower than it actually is.156 
  
 153. See David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Re-
form: Employment at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1006 (1998). Millon 
draws on recent economic research to advance the claim that the endowment effect alters the 
distribution of gains from trade in employment contracting. Id. at 1005-10; see also Daniel 
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment 
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326-29 (1990). The authors discuss 
the endowment effect’s impact on market efficiency. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra, at 
1325. Specifically, because owners of entitlements place a higher value on them than do 
prospective buyers, the endowment effect can lead to fewer trades of such entitlements than 
would occur if valuation were independent of ownership. Id. at 1326-28. As the gap between 
buyers’ and sellers’ valuations widens, the possibility of a mutually advantageous trade di-
minishes. Id. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes put the principle this way:  
It is in the nature of man’s mind. A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your 
own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and 
cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, 
however you came by it.  
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV, 457, 477 (1897). 
 154. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The En-
dowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 199-203 (1991) 
(providing evidence supporting the endowment effect and status quo biases and discussing 
their relation to the bias of loss aversion). The discussion of “loss aversion” was first coined 
by Kahneman and Tversky in the 1980s. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, 
Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342 (1984). Furthermore, the bias of loss 
aversion is embodied in the old expression that “possession is nine-tenths of the law” and is 
subsequently reflected in many judicial opinions and areas of law. See David Cohen & Jack 
Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Disparities Between Measures of Economic Values, 30 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 737, 749-69 (1992). The authors explain, for example, in tort law, judges 
make the distinction between “loss by way of expenditure and failure to make gain.” Id. at 
753. A similar distinction is made in contract law; a party that breaches a contract is more 
likely to be held to the original terms if the action is taken to make an unforeseen gain than if 
it is taken to avoid a loss. Id. at 761. 
 155. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 199, 199, 204 (2006). The authors “focus on scenarios in which optimism bias is 
thought to produce an overall underestimation by consumers of the risk associated with a 
given product” in consumer safety law. Id. at 208. They suggest possible ways to debias 
human behavior. Id. Specifically, “[i]n the consumer safety context, debiasing . . . would 
focus on putting at consumers’ cognitive disposal the prospect of negative outcomes from 
use, or at least unsafe use, of a particular product.” Id. at 212. For instance, the authors state: 
“[T]he law could require firms—on pain of administrative penalties or tort liability—to 
provide a truthful account of consequences that resulted from a particular harm-producing 
use of the product, rather than simply providing a generalized warning or statement that fails 
to harness availability.” Id. 
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Outcome Effect The tendency of a person who has knowledge 
of the eventual outcome of a decision to as-
sess the quality of the judgment of that deci-
sion with the other decision in mind.157 
Planning Fallacy The tendency to underestimate task-
completion times and to procrastinate.158 
Status Quo Bias159 The tendency for people to desire things to 
stay relatively the same.160 
 
Thus, when adults are acting in accordance with cognitive biases and 
childlike behavior, it is unclear whether they are the rational consumers 
contract theory expects them to be when engaging in market transactions. In 
combination, all of the evidence regarding child-like behavior of adults, 
superstition, consumer behavior patterns, and cognitive biases attacks as-
sumptions of classical contract theory.161 Therefore, if we assume human 
beings may not be rational actors, the desire to protect vulnerable contract-
  
 156. See Piety, supra note 142, at 403. Piety explains the tobacco industry relies 
heavily on the optimism bias to entice customers to purchase cigarettes. Id. If adults were not 
behaving irrationally and engaging in the optimistic bias, tobacco sales and cigarette-related 
deaths would undoubtedly plummet. 
 157. Peter M. Clarkson, Craig Emby & Vanessa W-S Watt, Debiasing the Outcome 
Effect: The Role of Instructions in an Audit Litigation Setting, AUDITING, Sept. 2002, at 7, 7. 
The authors examine the outcome effect when an evaluator has knowledge of the outcome of 
a judge’s decision. Id. “If the evaluator has knowledge of a negative outcome, then that 
knowledge negatively influences [the] assessment of the ex ante judgment.” Id. (emphasis 
added). The findings of their study suggest the “use of relatively nonintrusive instructions to 
evaluators [warning them of the outcome effect] may effectively counteract the potential for 
the outcome bias.” Id. (emphasis added). However, in real life, humans do not always receive 
such instructions about the outcome effect, and thus engage in behavior not befitting a ra-
tional actor. 
 158. See Andrew J. Wistrich, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Statutes of Limitation, 
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 607, 621 (2008). Wistrich argues statutes of limitation are dead-
lines. Id. at 609. He discusses how “psychologists have discovered a great deal about how 
people respond to deadlines during the past thirty years, [but] the basic structure of statutes 
of limitation has not changed since at least 1623.” Id. at 607, 614. Wistrich concludes we 
need a more modern approach to the statute of limitations given our tendency to procrastinate 
and engage in the planning fallacy. Id. at 666-67. 
 159. See, e.g., Shane Frederick, Automated Choice Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 555 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & 
Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). 
 160. See Nick Bostrom & Toby Ord, The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias 
in Applied Ethics, 116 ETHICS 656-79 (2006). Bostrom and Ord focus on consequentialist 
ethical judgments and how a genuine status quo bias can be characterized as a cognitive error 
in these situations. Id. at 658-72. They examine instances where one option is incorrectly 
judged to be better than another because it represents the status quo. Id. at 658-62. 
 161. See infra Section II.B. 
238 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2013:1  
ing parties increases. Increasing the usage of the doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity is one way in which the legal system can further shield susceptible par-
ties from unfair contracts. Without genuine rationality, assent, bargaining 
power, and economic equality, freedom of contract merely becomes a recipe 
for exploitation and injustice.  
C. Contracting Parties Make Decisions Based on Complete Information? 
In addition to assuming contracting parties are rational actors, the 
rhetoric of classical contract theory also tends to leave out the neoclassical 
economic assumption that unrestricted economic activity produces efficient 
results only under conditions of perfect information.162 For argument’s sake, 
even if all adults are rational actors, they still do not obtain sufficient infor-
mation to make intelligent decisions in contracts. The expression of “con-
tract failure” can be used to describe the absence of full understanding and 
information in contracts.163 
Contract failure due to a lack of complete information often occurs 
because buyers fail to read the terms in standard form contracts.164 Further-
more, even if consumers do read a form contract, it is often inefficient for 
consumers to bear the “search and deliberation” costs necessary to under-
stand the complex contractual legal language of the contract.165 One expla-
nation as to why contracting individuals do not read form contracts and thus 
fail to gain complete information is that buyers are boundedly rational.166 
That is, the rationality of individuals to attain information is affected by the 
  
 162. See David Bear, Comment, Establishing A Moral Duty to Obey the Law 
Through a Jurisprudence of Law and Economics, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 491, 527 (2007). 
 163. Michael J. Trebilcock & Steven Elliott, The Scope and Limit of Legal Paternal-
ism: Altruism and Coercion in Family Financial Arrangements, in THE THEORY OF 
CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 45, 54 (Peter Benson ed., 2001). Trebilcock and Elliott explain 
that even if a contracting party has mental capacity, a contract could still not reflect the per-
son’s underlying preferences. Id. at 59-62. This failure to reflect a party’s underlying prefer-
ences can be a result of coercion or information failure. Id. at 59. Specifically, information 
failure may be the result of misrepresentation by the other party or simply a lack of adequate 
information. Id. at 62. 
 164. See, e.g., John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 299 (2000) (“Courts know that parties sign or manifest assent to 
standard form contracts that they have not read, understood or negotiated.”); Todd D. Rakoff, 
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983) 
(stating “[v]irtually every scholar who has written about contracts of adhesion” accepts the 
claim that “the adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read the standard terms”). Also, 
Rakoff explains that an additional factor to consider when evaluating whether form contracts 
are unconscionable is that many form contracts are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis 
where no negotiating occurs. Rakoff, supra, at 1225. This is because the buyer usually lacks 
access to an employee who has the authority to alter the terms of the contract. Id.  
 165. See Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 243-44. 
 166. See Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1218.  
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cognitive limitations of their minds, such as the biases discussed previously 
in this Article167 and the finite amount of time they have to make deci-
sions.168 Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect consumers to be able to read 
and comprehend the information provided in complex contracts. 
The relational context of contracts also can create an absence of com-
plete information for contracting parties.169 In other words, modern com-
merce is interdependent—multiple parties are all working together to buy 
and sell products and services. The result of this interdependence is that 
each party engages in specialization and relies on the information of other 
parties with whom they conduct business.170 In reference to the interdepend-
ence among contracting parties, John R. Commons, a founding father of 
Institutionalism, states, “As this interdependence enlarges with commerce, 
the ignorance of each individual enlarges, and each depends more and more 
on confidence in the honesty, diligence, promptness and good management 
of others.”171 That is, parties become more ignorant about the information 
required for informed transactions because they can place confidence in 
other contracting parties.172 Thus, before specialization and interdependence 
in market transactions, parties were better informed on the individual lev-
el.173 
Advertising also makes it difficult for consumers to receive perfect in-
formation because by their nature, marketing and commercials are designed 
to shield consumers from some information about a product.174 In most situ-
ations, the sellers have more knowledge than the buyer because they have 
the expertise about a particular product and understand the costs and bene-
fits of the product. The sellers have much more information than the con-
sumers; therefore, an exchange of information diminishes with advertis-
ing.175 
Furthermore, the prevalence of advertising affects a person’s ability to 
make decisions with relevant and full information. In terms of television 
advertising, the estimation that the average television stays turned on almost 
  
 167. See supra Section II.B. 
 168. See Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1209. 
 169. See Ostas, supra note 1, at 541. 
 170. See COMMONS, supra note 59, at 204. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. The economic significance of confidence is also found in tort law. Id. 
Since 1580, courts have used tort law “to protect the reputation of a manufacturer who had 
built up a business on the confidence that he had inspired in customers.” Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. One study found that 70% of advertisement viewers knew very little about a 
discussed health condition and side effects of a product even after seeing drug advertise-
ments about the health condition and product. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER PRESCRIPTION DRUG ADVERTISING 
7-8 (2001). 
 175. See JAMES W. HENDERSON, HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY 300 (5th ed. 2012). 
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six hours a day creates a hugely influential source of information for most 
consumers.176 Instead of providing a detailed explanation of product details 
or attributes, most advertisements give consumers catchy one-liners deliv-
ered through violence or sex appeal.177 The conclusion from this information 
is that advertisers entice consumers to purchase their products not through 
informing them fully, but rather through psychological conditioning.178 Be-
cause the television is such a common source of product information, con-
sumers are encouraged vigorously to base their consumption decisions on 
incomplete information they receive through conditioning. This “condition-
ing effect is not based on rational [or informed] economic considera-
tions,”179 and thus the foundations of contract theory further disintegrate.  
III. COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO UNCONSCIONABILITY 
Our vision and legal reasoning extends only as far as our experience 
permits. If all we know is American law, we limit ourselves from fully ex-
ploring the ways in which other legal systems help ensure fairness in con-
tracts. Throughout history, other nations have looked to the United States as 
a leader in legal reasoning and public policy.180 However, in terms of ensur-
ing fairness in contract law, some nations are beginning to surpass their 
unconscionability predecessor, the United States. 
A. Australia 
Australia has followed the American lead in recognizing unconsciona-
ble contracts, but has since taken a greater interest in ensuring fair contracts 
  
 176. See Omar Lee Reed, The Psychological Impact of TV Advertising and the Need 
for FTC Regulation, 13 AM. BUS. L.J. 171, 171 (1975) (summarizing statistics from the Re-
port on the Twentieth Century Fund Commission on Campaign Costs in the Election Era). 
 177. Id. at 176-77. Reed explains how ad campaigns become successful not due to 
their ability to provide complete information, but rather from catch phrases. Id. For example, 
National Airlines had an ad campaign in which a seductive flight attendance used the slogans 
“Fly Me” or “I’m going to fly you like you’ve never been flown before.” Id. at 177 (empha-
sis omitted). As a result of this campaign, National Airlines reported a 23% increase that 
year, which was nearly twice that of the industry as a whole. Id. at 176. 
 178. Id. at 177. Reed further contends that advertisers have shown themselves attuned 
to conditioning theory by their reduction of commercial time slots from sixty seconds to 
thirty seconds or shorter. Id. Conditioning theory predicts that two thirty-second time slots 
would condition the audience to purchase a product better than one sixty-second advertise-
ment. Id. 
 179. Id. at 180. 
 180. For example, in 1987, on the Constitution’s bicentennial, of the 170 countries 
that existed, more than 160 wrote charters modeled directly or indirectly on the U.S. version. 
Adam Liptak, ‘We the People’ Loses Appeal with People Around the World, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 6. 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/us/we-the-people-loses-appeal-with-
people-around-the-world.html. 
 Contingent Assumptions of Contract Theory 241 
and bargaining.181 Now, Australia is at the forefront of unconscionability 
law.182 Australia’s statutory regulation of unconscionable contracts can be 
found in the Trade Practices Act of 1974.183 Part IV.A includes three provi-
sions for unconscionability, sections 51AA (enacted in 1992), 51AB (1986), 
and 51AC (1998).184 These provisions recognize unconscionability in con-
sumer transactions, small business dealings, and everything else, respective-
ly.185 Specifically, 51AB(2) lists factors relevant to determining whether 
conduct is unconscionable, such as: 
(a) [T]he relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the corporation and the 
consumer; 
(b) [W]hether . . . the consumer was required to comply with conditions that were 
not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the 
corporation; 
(c) [W]hether the consumer was able to understand any documents relating to the 
supply . . . of the goods or services; 
(d) [W]hether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair tactics 
were used against, the consumer . . . ; and 
(e) [T]he amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the consumer 
could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from [another] 
person [or firm].186 
Similar to the United States, a plaintiff may sue for remedies if a party 
is in breach of the aforementioned provisions of the law.187 However, in 
addition to private remedies, in Australia public law remedies are also a 
common response to unconscionable contracts.188 In short, section 51AA 
adds a public law component to the policing of unconscionable conduct in a 
commercial setting.189 “On the public law front, the Australia Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the designated statutory watchdog, 
can sue for injunctions or declarations.”190 Furthermore, “[t]he ACCC may 
also bring representative actions claiming relief on behalf of the defendant’s 
victims.”191 This state-regulated protection for the fairness of contracts in 
  
 181. See Anthony J. Duggan, The Trumping of Mateship: Unconscionability in the 
High Court of Australia, 39 CAN. BUS. L.J. 275, 275 (2003).  
 182. See id.  
 183. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (Austl.). 
 184. Id. at ss 51AA-AC; Duggan, supra note 181, at 276. 
 185. See Duggan, supra note 181, at 275. 
 186. s 51AB(2).  
 187. Duggan, supra note 181, at 277. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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Australia should act as an example to countries like the United States192 that 
are currently struggling to put the principles of their unconscionability doc-
trines into practice.193 
B. Canada 
Despite the fact the United States falls behind Australia in terms of 
regulating unconscionability, the United States does remain influential in 
helping other developed nations develop their own canons of unconsciona-
bility law.194 Specifically, our neighbors to the north in Canada have yet to 
  
 192. Perhaps the United States has the doctrine of unconscionability as codified in the 
U.C.C. because we lack the regulatory attention to power differences that other countries like 
Australia have.  
 193. Although some states in the United States have legislative acts preventing un-
conscionability, there is no uniform statutory provision like Australia’s. See, e.g., OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (LexisNexis 2004). For example, consumer protection statutes, such as 
the Ohio consumer protection statute, generally list factors, similar to those considered by the 
courts under the U.C.C. or common law, to be weighed in making a determination of uncon-
scionability under the statute. Id. § 1345.03(B). Ohio’s statute takes into consideration many 
of the factors of Australia’s. Id. The statute seeks to determine: 
(1) Whether the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of the con-
sumer reasonably to protect consumer’s interests because of the consumer’s 
physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand 
the language of an agreement; 
(2) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was entered in-
to that the price was substantially in excess of the price at which similar proper-
ty or services were readily obtainable in similar consumer transactions by like 
consumers; 
(3) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was entered in-
to of the inability of the consumer to receive a substantial benefit from the sub-
ject of the consumer transaction; 
(4) Whether the supplier knew at the time the consumer transaction was entered in-
to that there was no reasonable probability of payment of the obligation in full 
by the consumer; 
(5) Whether the supplier required the consumer to enter into a consumer transac-
tion on terms the supplier knew were substantially one-sided in favor of the 
supplier; 
(6) Whether the supplier knowingly made a misleading statement of opinion on 
which the consumer was likely to rely to the consumer’s detriment; 
(7) Whether the supplier has, without justification, refused to make a refund in 
cash or by check for a returned item that was purchased with cash or by check, 
unless the supplier had conspicuously posted in the establishment at the time of 
the sale a sign stating the supplier’s refund policy.  
Id.  
 194. Both the French and German legal systems also treat contracts that are “unbar-
gained for” with broad, flexible provisions similar to the U.C.C. See James H. Agger, Un-
conscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 4 AM. BUS. L.J. 127, 144 
(1966). Article 138 of the German Civil Code takes both a general and specific approach to 
harsh contracts that are against “good morals (gegen die guten Sitten).” Id. Furthermore, 
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fully embrace a doctrine of unconscionability as broad as outlined in § 2-
302 of the U.C.C. or the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Currently in 
Canada, unlike in the United States, unconscionability is a basis for a rescis-
sion of a contract as a whole, but not necessarily for the non-enforcement of 
a particular term that would cause an unfair or unreasonable result.195 Fur-
thermore, the doctrine of unconscionability in Canada rests more heavily on 
finding “inequality of bargaining power,”196 and “this phrase may stand in 
the way of adapting to a marketplace in which the vast majority of contracts 
do not involv[e] bargaining.”197 In reality, most contracts are between a 
business and a consumer, and as such, the consumer is not able to bargain at 
all.198  
As Canada moves forward with adopting a more pervasive uncon-
scionability doctrine, some provinces have enacted unconscionability laws 
for consumer transactions.199 Furthermore, the Ontario Law Reform Com-
mission recommended the enactment of a general unconscionability provi-
sion first for sales contracts200 and then for general contracts at large.201 The 
inspiration for these initiatives has been § 2-302 of the U.C.C. In Canada’s 
acceptance of the U.C.C.’s provisions for unconscionability, the importance 
of U.S. regulations regarding unfair contracts becomes clear. Now if only 
U.S. courts could reflect the sentiments of the Code in their decisions, the 
United States could once again be at the forefront of protecting the vulnera-
ble through contract law.  
C. Germany 
Germany introduced the main components of its unconscionability law 
in the German Civil Code of 1900.202 The Code has three main provisions 
relating to unconscionability.203 Article 138 reads: 
(1) A transaction that offends good morals (guten Sitten) is void.  
  
“[t]he French doctrine of abus des droits . . . has been used both as a shield and a sword” 
against unconscionability. Id.  
 195. See JOHN D. MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 420 (2005).  
 196. Id. at 407, 409-11. 
 197. Jean Braucher, Unconscionability in the Age of Sophisticated Mass-Market 
Framing Strategies and the Modern Administrative State, 45 CAN. BUS. L.J. 382, 385 (2007).  
 198. Id. at 386 (citing MCCAMUS, supra note 195, at 191). 
 199. See JACOB S. ZIEGEL & ANTHONY J. DUGGAN, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER 
SALES TRANSACTIONS: CASES, TEXT AND MATERIALS 122-23 (2002). 
 200. ONT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON SALE OF GOODS 156 (1979). 
 201. ONT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON AMENDMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 
136-37 (1987).  
 202. John P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1041, 1044-45 (1976). 
 203. See id. at 1053. 
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(2) Void in particular is a transaction whereby one person, with exploitation of the 
necessity, thoughtlessness or inexperience of another, is promised or acquires, 
for himself or for a third party, economic advantages whose value exceeds the 
value of his own performance to such a degree that, under the circumstances, 
there is a striking disproportion between them.204  
Scholars have noted several differences between Article 138 and § 2-
302 of the U.C.C. First, Article 138 appears in the General Part of the Ger-
man Civil Code, meaning that it applies to all contract law.205 Second, Arti-
cle 138 provides a more blunt remedy for unconscionable contracts, giving 
judges only the option to discard entire contracts, rather than reopening the 
contract, modifying terms, or pursuing other options American judges 
have.206 Third, Article 138 describes specific instances when a contract is 
“unconscionable.”207 Alternatively, § 2-302 is much more general and 
leaves unconscionable undefined.208 In theory, this generality gives U.S. 
judges much more discretion, but in practice, when German judges combine 
Article 138 with the other two articles discussed below, they have similar 
discretion.209 
Article 242 of the German Civil Code states, “Obligations shall be 
performed in the manner required by good faith, with regard to commercial 
usage.”210 Courts began to use this Article often during the period of high 
inflation post-WWI for contracts dealing with repayment of debt, but since 
then, the Article has made inroads throughout German contract law.211  
A brief review of three broad classes of cases applying Article 242 
will help distinguish it from Article 138. The first group of cases involves 
instances where the party who was given a promise by another misuses its 
contractual rights.212 An example is when an insurance company cancels a 
policy after a late premium payment, which courts have ruled violates good 
faith. 213 A second group involves cases where one party seeks a harsh rem-
edy for a contractual breach by the other party when a less burdensome al-
  
 204. Id. at 1052 (translating Article 138 of the German Civil Code). 
 205. Id. at 1046; A.H. Angelo & E.P. Ellinger, Unconscionable Contracts: A Com-
parative Study of the Approaches in England, France, Germany, and the United States, 14 
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 455, 495 (1992). 
 206. See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 205, at 495-96. 
 207. Id. at 496.  
 208. Id. at 497.  
 209. Id. at 498.  
 210. See Dawson, supra note 202, at 1044 (translating Article 242 of the German 
Civil Code). 
 211. Id. at 1045. Reflecting its influence, Dawson notes that a standard commentary 
on the Civil Code devotes 1,388 pages to analyzing court decisions invoking Article 242. Id. 
at 1045 n.5. 
 212. See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 205, at 491. 
 213. Id. 
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ternative exists.214 For example, if one party receives damaged goods, that 
party should seek repairs before exiting the contract entirely.215 The third 
group contains cases where one party tells the other certain provisions of a 
contract need not be followed, only later to enforce them, such as when 
deadlines are said to be lax, only later to be stringently enforced by an in-
surance company.216 
Generalizing from these cases, we can see that Article 242 is invoked 
primarily for cases involving the unconscionable exercise of contractual 
rights, whereas Article 138 applies to unconscionable contractual terms. 
Thus, under this Article 242, “the courts are able to combat the unfair use of 
contractual rights, even where the clause conferring these rights is not un-
conscionable per se.”217 American courts have not attempted to rule against 
the unconscionable exercise of contractual terms, despite similarity in lan-
guage between Article 242 and § 1-203 of the U.C.C.218 
Finally, Article 826 of the German Civil Code reads, “One who inten-
tionally injures another by conduct offending good morals must make repa-
ration.”219 Under this article, German courts have developed a body of tort 
law that seeks to combat the harmful actions of groups with “overriding, 
economic power.”220  
So it became an offense to good morals to interfere intentionally with present and 
prospective contracts or advantageous relations, when the motive was destructive, 
when disapproved means such as violence or fraud were threatened or used, or 
where harm inflicted was out of proportion to the interests being served. . . . As 
early as 1920, there had emerged a network of court-created rules providing dam-
ages or preventative relief over a wide and steadily expanding range of intentional-
ly harmful conduct.221 
Overall, Germany can learn from U.S. unconscionability law in the 
way § 2-302 gives U.S. judges more flexibility to alter or delete specific 
terms of an unconscionable contract, rather than provide a blunt tool of de-
ciding whether to let a contract stand or discard it in its entirety.222 However, 
the United States can learn from German law in the way Article 242 pro-
vides extra protection against the unfair exercise of contractual rights.223  
  
 214. Id. at 492. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 506.  
 218. Id. 
 219. Dawson, supra note 202, at 1045 (translating Article 826 of the German Civil 
Code).  
 220. Id. at 1045-46. 
 221. Id. at 1046. 
 222. See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 205, at 505. 
 223. Id. at 505-06.  
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D. France 
Unlike Germany, Australia, and the United States, France does not 
have a general unconscionability doctrine.224 However, a patchwork of pro-
visions throughout French law provides contracting parties protection 
against contractual unfairness in similar ways as other countries do under 
the scope of their unconscionability law.225 This protection is weighed 
against the important place freedom of contract has in the French Civil 
Code.226 Article 1134 states, “‘An agreement legally entered into is law for 
those who made it.’”227 
Contracting parties find some protection against unfairness in the 
French Civil Code. First, several articles outline some basic requirements of 
equality and fairness for contracts. Article 1108 of the Civil Code stipulates, 
“‘In order that a contract should be valid, it must comply with four condi-
tions. There must be consent by the party bound; the person must be capable 
of contracting; the subject matter of the contract must be certain; [and] the 
“cause” of the contract must be lawful.’”228 Articles 1109 through 1133 con-
tinue by declaring a contract void if a party consents as a result of mistake 
(erreur), duress (violence), or fraud (dol).229 
Second, using la lesion (Article 1118), courts are able to annul a con-
tract that, through an imbalance between the parties, has caused one party to 
be disadvantaged and incur an undue loss.230 The applicability of lesion is 
limited however because it applies only to certain types of contracts and 
under specific definitions of the size of the loss.231 
A third source for contractual fairness is the concept of cause. Article 
1131 reads, “An obligation without cause, or one based on a false or illicit 
cause, can have no effect.”232 Article 1133 specifies, “A cause is illicit when 
it is prohibited by law or when it is contrary to good morals or the public 
order.”233 Cause has been used to rescind contractual unfairness in cases 
  
 224. See Séverine Saintier, Loyalty as a Tool to Combat Contractual Unfairness: A 
French Perspective, in UNCONSCIONABILITY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL 
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 233. Id. at 195 n.13 (translating Article 1133 of the French Civil Code).  
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where continued adherence to a contract lacks a cause.234 For example, 
French courts declared void a contract in a case involving a video rental 
shop, which contracted to get the videos from larger companies, only to 
argue its contracts with the distributors lacked cause when the rental shop 
went out of business.235 French courts have also used cause as a basis for 
annulling a contract when the contracting parties lack proportional obliga-
tions.236 
A fourth legal source for combating contractual unfairness is the 
clauses abusives in Article L 132-1 of the 1978 Consumer Code.237 It states, 
“[I]n contracts concluded between a business and a non-business or con-
sumers, clauses which aim to create or result in the creation, to the detri-
ment of the non-professional or the consumer, of a significant imbalance 
between the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract, are un-
fair.”238 
The Article continues with a non-exhaustive list of unfair contractual 
clauses; for example, restricting a party “from establishing irrefutably the 
consumer’s adherence to clauses that the latter has not actually had the op-
portunity to become aware of prior to conclusion of the contract;”239 “from 
authorising the business to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration 
without giving reasonable advance notice, without just cause;”240 or “from 
obliging the consumer who has failed to perform his/her obligations to pay 
compensation in a disproportionately high amount.”241 
A 1991 ruling by the Court of Cassation nullified a contract containing 
a clause it found abusive, even though the clause was not explicitly listed in 
any specific law.242 The court thereby generalized the notion of offering 
general protection against unfair contractual clauses.243 Lastly, similar to 
Germany, French courts employ the concept of loyalty or good faith to en-
sure contractual fairness.244 One area where courts have used loyalty or good 
faith in their decisions is in cases of contractual fraud. The courts have 
linked loyalty and good faith to the obligation of disclosure for contracting 
parties.245 This link may be weakening, however, since the 1970s, because 
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in more recent cases the Court of Cassation has held that silence about per-
tinent information is not punishable and has not mentioned loyalty or good 
faith in the decisions.246 
Thus, the major difference between France and other legal systems is 
that France does not have a general unconscionability provision. However, 
there is evidence that France is moving toward more generality, as dis-
cussed above with the general provision courts are beginning to provide 
against unfair clauses.247 Additionally, like the United States, but unlike 
Germany, French judges do revise provisions of unconscionable con-
tracts.248 
E. Commonalities in U.S., German, and French Law 
Despite different provisions and approaches, these three legal systems 
are in agreement in many broad principles, as Alphonse M. Squillante out-
lines: 
1. Commonality of Language: Even though the language is not exactly the same, 
the meaning of public order, good morals and unconscionability is the same in 
all three systems, and the same are recurrent themes in the three Codes; 
2. Overreaching: The courts of all three systems will react adversely to any con-
tract that is overreaching, oppressive or so unfair as to shock the courts’ con-
sciences; 
3. Bad Bargains: None of the systems will protect the person who makes a bad 
bargain. A bad bargain is not a basis for invoking the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility in the Codes; 
4. Total Transaction: All three courts will look to the subjective and objective facts 
of the total transaction before reaching a decision of whether to enforce the con-
tract; 
5. Specific Contracts: Each system specifically scrutinizes certain types of con-
tracts because by their very nature they are subject to possible abuse by one par-
ty of the other. Contracts involving labor, insurance, concessionaires of public 
services (called regulated monopolies in the United States) and standard form 
contracts are carefully policed to make sure that no unfair advantage is taken by 
one party over another; 
6. Unbargained for Contracts: Broad provisions in all three Codes deal with unbar-
gained for contracts to protect against unconscionability. Such contracts are 
governed by article 138 of the German Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, article 1382 of 
the French Civil Code, and section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code; 
  
 246. Id. at 71.  
 247. See supra Section II.D and accompanying text. 
 248. See generally Pierre Legrand Jr., Judicial Revision of Contracts in French Law: 
A Case-Study, 62 TUL. L. REV. 963 (1988). 
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7. Grounds for Use: Factors that are considered relevant to granting or denying re-
scission or reformation of contract are uniquely similar; they include one-
sidedness of the bargain, form and disclaimer of liability; 
8. Use of the Doctrine: None of the courts base their decisions on the unconsciona-
bility doctrine merely because it can resolve a number of ills. Rather, uncon-
scionability has taken on a distinct application revolving about notions of fair 
play.249 
IV. CASE LAW: THE UNCLEAR DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY 
Due to the uncertain criteria of the doctrine of unconscionability, 
many in the American legal community hoped courts would establish the 
necessary definitions, rules, and procedures for application.250 In using § 2-
302 of the U.C.C. to rule contracts unconscionable, American courts ques-
tion whether the traditional common law concept of freedom of contract is 
capable of adequately protecting the consumer and further clarify what 
makes a contract unconscionable.251  
The courts have not succeeded in establishing a general formula or 
clear guidelines for applying the vague concept of unconscionability.252 The 
result is that court decisions have conflicted, and the doctrine’s rules have 
been applied inconsistently.253 Courts therefore have applied the doctrine of 
unconscionability on a case-by-case basis using a totality of the circum-
stances test.254 Also, uncertainty remains as to whether both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability must be present, further muddying the waters 
of unconscionability. Additionally, case law does not indicate the weight to 
be given to the different factors involving unconscionable contracts and 
whether all forms of unconscionability are equally damaging to a con-
  
 249. Alphonse M. Squillante, Unconscionability: French, German, Anglo-American 
Application, 34 ALB. L. REV. 297, 298 (1970) (footnotes omitted). 
 250. See DEUTCH, supra note 30, at 111. 
 251. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 84, 86 (N.J. 
1960). The Henningsen court stated: “[T]he basic tenet of freedom of competent parties to 
contract is a factor of importance[, but] . . . such rules cannot be applied on a strict, doctrinal 
basis,” because “in present-day commercial life the standardized mass contract has appeared 
. . . [and] is used primarily by enterprises with strong bargaining power and position.” Id.  
 252. Some states have created tests for unconscionability, but these tests suffer from 
the same problems the doctrine of unconscionability and case law precedent suffer from 
vague or ambiguous standards or tests. See, e.g., Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Branch, 793 So. 2d 
738, 748 (Ala. 2000). The Alabama courts use a two-part test to assess unconscionability. A 
contract is unconscionable if: (1) Its terms are grossly favorable (2) to a party with over-
whelming bargaining power. Id. However, the problems of systematically defining “grossly 
favorable” and “overwhelming bargaining power” still exist. 
 253. See DEUTCH, supra note 30, at xv. 
 254. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the 
Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 354-55 (1970). 
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tract.255 As a result, courts are free to pick and choose among a range of 
factors in order to achieve a fair result and ensure unconscionable contracts 
are not enforced.256 
However, in cases where factors suggest unconscionability, judges 
still rule against unconscionability and implicitly evoke Adam Smith’s lais-
sez-faire statement: “Every man, [so] long as he does not violate the laws of 
justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest [in] his own way,”257 
or John Stuart Mill’s anti-paternalistic statement: “[T]he only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”258  
Thus, it is surprising that so important a question as whether a contract 
must meet a general requirement of fairness has not been dealt with more 
authoritatively by the courts.259 One would expect that as research under-
mines the traditional assumptions of contract theory, judges would begin 
finding more contracts unconscionable. However, the number of cases in 
which the courts found unconscionability has not significantly increased 
over time.260 The following are two of the many cases in which the courts 
should have found contracts unconscionable but did not do so based on 
questionable assumptions about human rationality and information. These 
cases are merely illustrations of the countless cases warranting, but not rely-
ing on, the equitable arguments provided by the unconscionability doctrine.  
A. Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corporation 
Harris v. Green Tree Financial Corp.261 is one of many cases in which 
companies have taken advantage of elderly customers.262 In Harris, the U.S. 
  
 255. See Lary Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just Economy: An Argument 
for Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 815, 816 (1987). 
 256. See Gerald T. McLaughlin, Unconscionability and Impracticability: Reflections 
on Two U.C.C. Indeterminacy Principles, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 439, 446 (1992).  
 257. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 745 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Li-
brary 2000) (1776). In other words, people should have the freedom to act and contract at 
their own discretion. Courts conform to the hands-off approach by refusing to regulate unfair 
contracts in unconscionability cases. 
 258. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, ESSAY ON BENTHAM 135 
(Mary Warnock ed., 1962) (1861).  
 259. See KOFFMAN & MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 446.  
 260. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 52, at 1100. Dimatteo and Rich conducted an 
empirical evaluation of unconscionability cases. Their cases were drawn from two time peri-
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the two periods, this increase was not statistically significant. Id. at 1100-01. 
 261. 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found an arbitration provision in a 
home improvement contract enforceable against the homeowners’ challeng-
es that the provision was unconscionable.263 However, the court should have 
found the contractual provisions void pursuant to the doctrine of uncon-
scionability. In Harris, Green Tree Financial Corporation recruited building 
contractors to sell home improvements to homeowners to be financed by 
high interest, secondary mortgage contracts, which were in turn sold to ei-
ther Green Tree.264 The contractors they selected were instructed to target 
“relatively unsophisticated, low- to middle-income, senior citizens.”265 The 
plaintiffs claimed that Green Tree instructed the contractors to use high-
pressure sales tactics, such as in-home sales and telemarketing, and to as-
sure the customer that the cost of the improvements would be reasonable 
and that they did not have to pay until they were satisfied with the im-
provements.266  
Furthermore, the contracts also potentially had misleading and fraudu-
lent provisions, according to the plaintiffs.267 Also, some of the work was 
not completed as promised by the contractors and other work was unsatis-
factory.268 Nothing was done by Green Tree to fix the unsatisfactory work, 
despite numerous complaints.269 As a result, some of the homeowners chal-
lenged the contract on the grounds that it was unconscionable, and Green 
Tree moved to compel arbitration.270 
Many of the terms in the contract should have been considered uncon-
scionable. First and foremost, the targeting of a vulnerable group triggers 
consideration that perhaps the contracts were not created in good faith or 
  
 262. For another case involving pressuring an elderly woman to engage in an uncon-
scionable contract, see Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). See 
also Brooke Overby, Contract, in the Age of Sustainable Consumption, 27 J. CORP. L. 603, 
616 (2002) (noting elderly targets have become the target of fraud and predatory lending 
practices). 
 263. Harris, 183 F.3d at 176, 184.  
 264. Id. at 176. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 177. For a summarized discussion of some of the more salient provisions, 
see also Meadows, supra note 15. Meadows explains: 
One such provision . . . [challenged] high premiums for collateral protection insur-
ance. Another . . . was an arbitration provision which required the homeowners to 
arbitrate all disputes but permitted the lender to use judicial proceedings to enforce 
the loan or the mortgage. Because collection of the debt and enforcement of the 
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Id. at 750-51 n.76 (citations omitted) (citing Harris, 183 F.3d at 176, 177-78). 
 268. Harris, 183 F.3d at 177.  
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
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under fair terms. The inequality of bargaining power was aggravated with 
the high-pressure sales tactics used against the senior citizens.271 Additional-
ly, the arbitration agreement was highly inconspicuous and hidden on the 
back of a page in small print.272 Small, inconspicuous fine print is one sign 
of procedural unconscionability. Furthermore, the lack of reciprocal obliga-
tions to arbitrate also created inequality of bargaining power.273 Pursuant to 
the contract, Green Tree was able to litigate some claims while the borrow-
ers had to arbitrate all claims.274 However, this is unreasonably favorable to 
Green Tree, and thus substantively unconscionable. For all these reasons, 
the court should have found the contract Green Tree entered into with the 
elderly homeowners unconscionable. However, this court, like many that do 
not rule in favor of unconscionability, instead relied on the questionable 
assumptions underlying freedom of contract and rationality.275  
B. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto 
One type of contract with the potential to be held unconscionable is 
one containing arbitration agreements. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarot-
to276 concerns a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of a 
Subway sandwich shop in Montana.277 Doctors Associates, Inc. is a Con-
necticut corporation that owns Subway sandwich shop franchises, and a 
man by the name of Mr. Lombardi was its development agent in Montana.278 
The Casarottos were franchisees, entering into an agreement to operate a 
Subway franchise in Great Falls, Montana.279 However, they were told by 
Mr. Lombardi, the development agent, that their first choice for a location 
was unavailable.280 As a result, the franchisees agreed instead to open a 
Subway sandwich shop in another location with the caveat that if their pre-
  
 271. Id. at 176. 
 272. Id. at 182. 
 273. The Court held that “inequality in bargaining power, alone, is not a valid basis 
upon which to invalidate an arbitration agreement.” Id. at 183. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 184. 
 276. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).  
 277. Id. at 682. 
 278. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 932 (Mont. 1994), vacated, Doctor’s 
Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. 681. The judgment of this case was vacated and remanded for further 
consideration in light of Allied-Bruce Terminex Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 
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 279. Casarotto, 886 P.2d at 932. 
 280. Id. 
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ferred location became available one day, they would have the exclusive 
right to open a Subway there.281 However, the preferred location in Great 
Falls was instead awarded to another franchisee.282 As a result, the Casarot-
tos argue they lost business ultimately losing the collateral on their loan.283  
Furthermore, the contract contained a provision for mandatory arbitra-
tion somewhere within the lengthy document.284 Pursuant to Montana law at 
the time, if a contract contains an arbitration clause, it must state so clearly 
on the first page of the contract so that contracting parties understand arbi-
tration will occur.285 However, the Subway contract was not created in Mon-
tana, and therefore did not follow the regulations of Montana law.286 There-
fore, whether the Casarottos had reasonable knowledge, understanding, or 
bargaining power given the fact the arbitration clause was not mentioned on 
the first page as in all other contracts they negotiated is also questionable. 
As such, the arbitration agreement was inconspicuous, and the Casarottos 
did not reasonably expect there to be an arbitration clause because it was not 
mentioned on the first page as required by law in Montana.  
The Montana Supreme Court ruled against the arbitration agreement 
based on a Montana statute.287 Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the Montana statute in ques-
tion.288 However, if the Montana Supreme Court made its ruling based on 
unconscionability grounds, the U.S. Supreme Court would not have ruled 
the way it did because the unconscionability ruling would not be at odds 
with the Federal Arbitration Act.289 On this subject of unconscionability, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
Repeating our observation in Perry, the text of § 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] 
declares that state law may be applied “if that law arose to govern issues concern-
ing the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” Thus, gen-  
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 933. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 942 (Trieweiler, J., concurring). 
 286. Id.  
 287. Id. at 939 (majority opinion).  
 288. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (“We hold 
that Montana’s first-page notice requirement, which governs not ‘any contract,’ but specifi-
cally and solely contracts ‘subject to arbitration,’ conflicts with the FAA and is therefore 
displaced by the federal measure.”). 
 289. See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of 
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 193 (2004). In fact, a number of recent cases in 
California using the doctrine of unconscionability have attempted to circumvent the Federal 
Arbitration Act. Id. at 194-95. For a specific discussion of arbitration agreements being held 
unconscionable in a state other than California, see O’Donoghue v. Smythe, Cramer Co., No. 
80453, 2002 WL 1454074 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2002). In this case, the court ruled a home 
inspector’s limitation of liability in an arbitration agreement unconscionable since it preclud-
ed any meaningful remedy. Id. ¶ 31. 
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erally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, 
may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2.290 
Therefore, the Montana Supreme Court should have held the arbitra-
tion agreement unconscionable because it was inconspicuous,291 did not 
provide adequate notice of its contents, and ran counter to the reasonable 
expectations of average consumers.292 Further adding to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s comment about arbitration and unconscionability, federal or state 
courts in California,293 Hawaii,294 Missouri,295 Ohio,296 and Illinois297 have 
ruled that certain clauses in arbitration agreements can be unenforceable 
under the Federal Arbitration Act because they are unconscionable. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the codification of the doctrine of unconscionability in the Uni-
form Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, ques-
tions have persisted as to the meaning and the rationality of its applica-
tion.298 However, the uncertainty surrounding the definition of the doctrine 
should lead to its flexibility and adaptability to a variety of situations in 
future court decisions. The doctrine, while well intentioned, has not ade-
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quately protected the needs of vulnerable members of society because 
courts have not used the doctrine to its fullest potential.299  
There will always be some imbalance between contracting parties in 
terms of power, wealth, understanding, experience, and information. If 
lawmakers and judges insisted on absolute equality, we would have no more 
contracts. However, the law needs to adapt its philosophy of contracts to the 
recent research suggesting contracting parties may not be fully rational or 
informed. The antiquated assumptions of contract law prevent the courts 
from helping vulnerable parties prove unconscionability.300  
Legislatures too have institutional advantages in promulgating con-
tract terms relative to courts.301 If the goal is to create fairer contracts for the 
greatest percentage of parties possible, legislatures are likely to be more 
institutionally effective. However, ultimately it is the job of the courts to 
police contracts for unconscionability. Until they begin to employ the doc-
trine of unconscionability more frequently, the doctrine will remain an un-
derutilized tool in the court’s arsenal. 
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